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I. INTRODUCTION
King Vertigorn, it is said, wished to build a castle to defend Britain against invaders. Each day, his mason raised and set the stones.
Each night, however, the earth would rumble, bringing the work
* University Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. I thank
participants in the Symposium—particularly Professor Leandra Lederman, the primary
commentator on this Article at the Symposium—for their criticisms, observations, and
encouragement. I also thank Mary McCormick of the Florida State University College of
Law Research Center for research assistance.
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crashing to the ground. Vexed, Vertigorn asked Merlin for an explanation. Merlin’s mystical divination revealed that, in a cavern far
below the surface, there resided two foes, a red dragon and a white
dragon. In their perpetual struggle for dominance, first one dragon
then the other would gain temporary ascendancy. Their jostling unsettled the ground, rendering all construction temporary.
In federal tax procedure, the red dragon and the white dragon are
facilitation of revenue collection and fairness to taxpayers. Numerous
times during the first century of the modern federal income tax, the
courts have noted the centrality of the first value: “taxes are the lifeblood of government, and their prompt and certain availability an
imperious need.” 1 But, were that the only value, we could return to
brutal efficiency of the proscription system. We have refrained from
doing so because our limited government traditions demand that citizens’ claims to due process under the law be taken seriously.
Thus, tax administration in the United States—before, during,
and (no doubt) after the income tax’s first one hundred years—has
involved and will involve the balancing of the revenue facilitation
and fairness protection imperatives. 2 Just as the power balance between the red and white dragons fluctuated, so have the relative
weights accorded the two tax imperatives. During times of international or domestic crisis, we have looked to Government to save us
from threats. This demands opening wider the spigot of fiscal flows,
so the first tax value receives greater weight. During more placid
times, menace recedes, causing the virtues of the second value to appear more attractive.
In short, the pendulum swings between emphasis on revenue
maximization and taxpayer protection. This affects legislative, regulatory, and judicial actions; it implicates not just substantive rules of
tax liability and tax rates but also styles of statutory interpretation 3
and the rules and devices of tax procedure.
1. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935); see also United States v. Dalm,
494 U.S. 596, 604 (1990); United States v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 733
(1985); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 734 (1979).
2. The tension between the values has been evident since the founding of the American Republic. Alexander Hamilton, our first Secretary of the Treasury, proposed a general
ad valorem duty on all imports. “Immediate opposition in the Congress was rooted in a fear
of the alleged centralizing tendencies involved in creating a large force of collectors on the
Federal level.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, PUB. NO. 447, THE
UNITED STATES TAX SYSTEM: A BRIEF HISTORY 4 (1960). One of the opponents described the
proposal as the “horror of all free States,” one that was “hostile to the liberties of the people,” and which would “convulse the government; let loose a swarm of harpies, who, under
the domination of the revenue officers, will range the country prying into every man’s
house and affairs, and, like the Macedonian phalanx, bear down all before them.” Id.
3. This is reflected in the assertion, disappearance, and occasional reappearance in
federal tax jurisprudence of a canon under which tax statutes were construed strictly
against the Government and in favor of taxpayers. See, e.g., Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151,
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This Article is about the procedural rules. Specifically, it considers
the mechanisms by which disputes as to federal tax liabilities are resolved. The Article identifies an agenda for reforming federal tax litigation. 4 Fully developing the justifications for and the particulars of
the proposed changes necessarily is the work of more than one article. Thus, this Article sets the agenda, describing the core elements of
the changes (and, in some cases, the reaffirmations) I propose. Subsequent articles will develop specific proposals in greater detail.
Part II of this Article explores the criteria that should guide choices in this area. A fairly uncontroversial list of candidate criteria
would include such things as decisional accuracy, efficiency, and actual and perceived equity. However, considerable controversy likely
would exist, even among competent commentators, as to the relative
weights that should be accorded the criteria, both generally and in
application to particular situations.
Hence, in Part II, I will not focus on the weightings that best comport with my personal constellation of values. Instead, Part II
sketches key legislative, regulatory, and judicial events that have
shaped our current tax procedure rules. By distilling these events, we
can get a sense of the values that have actually driven the system.
Parts III, IV, and V apply those values to features of the federal
tax litigation system and thereby develop proposals. Specifically,
Part III considers reforms as to the judicial fora that should be available for the resolution of federal tax controversies. It offers three
principal recommendations: (1) the Tax Court should be given quasiplenary jurisdiction in civil tax matters (concurrent, not exclusive,
153 (1917) (“In case of doubt [statutes levying taxes] are construed most strongly against
the Government, and in favor of the citizen.”). Gould cited authorities as far back as Justice Story’s opinion in United States v. Wigglesworth, 28 F. Cas. 595 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842).
This canon was invoked in hundreds of federal cases in the 1800s and the first two
decades of the 1900s, when limited government was the predominant electoral preference.
It was largely replaced by pro-IRS canons (such as that I.R.C. § 61 is construed broadly, see
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429 (1955), and that tax deductions
and exemptions are construed narrowly, see Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 328
(1995) (exclusions); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) (deductions))
during the 1930s through 1970s, when we looked to Washington to save us from the Great
Depression, then Fascism, then Communism. Under the sway of the Reagan Revolution,
the pro-taxpayer canon returned to the stage briefly in the 1980s and 1990s. See, e.g.,
United Dominion Inds., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 839 (Thomas, J., concurring);
id. at 839 n.l (Stevens, J., dissenting). It has faded again since September 11, 2001. See
Steve R. Johnson, Should Ambiguous Revenue Laws Be Interpreted in Favor of Taxpayers?,
NEV. LAW., Apr. 2002, at 15-16.
The canon retains greater potency in state and local tax litigation. See Steve R.
Johnson, Pro-Taxpayer Interpretation of State-Local Tax Laws, 51 ST. TAX NOTES 441
(2009).
4. The reforms implicate litigation of all federal taxes, not just the income tax. However, the income tax is the most frequently litigated of the types imposed by the federal
government.
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jurisdiction); (2) proposals to create a national court of tax appeals
should continue to be rejected; and (3) the Court of Federal Claims
should be divested of jurisdiction to hear tax cases.
Part IV offers reforms as to the available forms of civil tax actions.
It urges two reforms: (1) repeal of the bulk of the TEFRA unified
partnership audit and litigation procedures, 5 and (2) reduction in the
scope of, but not elimination of, judicial review of Collection Due Process decisions by the IRS Appeals Office. 6
Finally, Part V addresses prerequisites to suits. It proposes that
the Flora full payment rule (that taxpayers must pay the full amount
of liability determined by the IRS as a prerequisite to bringing a tax
refund suit) be abolished. 7
II. CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING REFORMS
Law reform proposals based on idiosyncratic values preferences
are built on a foundation of quicksand. They are unlikely to gain
traction initially and to sustain it over time. I hope to erect this reform agenda on a more solid footing. Thus, I will emphasize not my
values but the values I perceive as embodied in and reflected by leading facets of the federal tax litigation system as it has developed. Below, I describe the sources that generate relevant criteria, identify
key events in the evolution of the current system, and adduce from
those developments the values on which the system is based.
A. Sources of Criteria
There are four principal sets of actors shaping norms governing
the procedural rules of taxation: Congress, the courts, federal tax
regulators (Main Treasury, 8 the IRS, and the Department of Justice), 9 and the communities of taxpayers, their representatives, and

5. See I.R.C. §§ 6221-6234. These provisions were enacted in their original form by
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (“TEFRA”), Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96
Stat. 324 (1982).
6. See I.R.C. §§ 6320, 6330.
7. See Flora v. United States (Flora II), 362 U.S. 145 (1960), reaff’g Flora v. United
States (Flora I), 357 U.S. 63 (1958).
8. The IRS is part of the Treasury Department. Unlike the IRS (which handles dayto-day tax administration and issues lower-level administrative guidance), other parts of
Treasury are involved in taxation at a more general level. So called “Main Treasury” finalizes tax regulations, represents the Administration in tax legislation, negotiates tax treaties, and, through its Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, monitors performance by the IRS.
9. For discussion of the roles and responsibilities of these actors, see LEANDRA LEDERMAN & STEPHEN W. MAZZA, TAX CONTROVERSIES: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1-29 (3d
ed. 2009); DAVID M. RICHARDSON, JEROME BORISON & STEVE JOHNSON, CIVIL TAX PROCEDURE 1-17 (2d ed. 2008).
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academic and other commentators. In routine situations, 10 Congress
is the dominant actor, both constitutionally 11 and prudentially. 12 But
it would be a mistake to see the relationships as strictly hierarchical.
Often they are interactive. Courts, through constitutional analysis
and statutory interpretation, and government and private professional communities, through advocacy and an “unwritten code” as to
how things should be done, also have been highly influential in the
development of values shaping the rules of tax procedure.13
The legitimate extent of such interaction is unsettled and is the
subject of considerable debate in many areas of law. For example,
some see statutory interpretation as a collaborative process by which
courts and legislatures formulate law interactively.14 Others have offered similar visions of constitutional law15 and administrative law.16
Tax is about as positivistic as any field of law gets, but courts have
made a great deal of the law even in tax. 17 This tradition was estab10. A non-routine situation would be, for example, when the courts hold that the Constitution forbids some item of tax legislation. The courts are reluctant to do so. Judicial
deference to Congress is considerable in matters of revenue raising. See, e.g., Nordlinger v.
Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1992); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S.
540, 547 (1983).
11. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1.
12. In dealing with the numerous complex considerations that formulating tax rules
entails, Congress has natural advantages over the courts. See United States v. Nunnally
Inv. Co., 316 U.S. 258, 264 (1942) (“The problem of legal remedies appropriate for fiscal
administration rests within easy Congressional control. Congress can deal with the matter
comprehensively, unembarrassed by the limitations of a litigation involving only one phase
of a complex problem.”); see also United States v. Kales, 314 U.S. 186, 200 (1941).
Some might argue that an expert agency could make better tax laws than a democratically selected legislature. Whether or not that is true, Congress surely possesses a
legitimacy in this area that Treasury lacks. See generally Andre L. Smith, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Federal Income Tax: May Congress Grant the President the Authority
to Set the Income Tax Rates?, 31 VA. TAX REV. 763 (2012).
13. This fact has been recognized for a long time. Over a half century ago, for example, an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury remarked on “one very important factor”: “As
our proposed regulations are published, a cumulative effect is being created. The regulations should give you an over-all indication of attitude on the part of the Treasury Department.” Laurens Williams, The Preparation and Promulgation of Treasury Department Regulations Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 8 TAX EXECUTIVE 3, 7-8 (1956) (emphasis
in original).
14. See, e.g., William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541 (1988).
15. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 326 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Constant, constructive discourse between our courts and our legislatures is an integral and admirable part of the constitutional design.”); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 408 (1989) (“Our principle of separation of powers anticipates that the coordinate
Branches will converse with each other on matters of vital common interest.”).
16. See, e.g., 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 138 (2d ed.
1978) (stating that administrative procedure is formulated by “[l]egislators and judges who
are working [as] partners [to] produce better law than legislators alone could possibly
produce”).
17. See, e.g., Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 499 n.25 (1943) (“Judge-made
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lished early, and it has proved enduring.18 The benefits of judicial
participation are doubted by some, however, 19 and the legitimacy of
such collaboration was debated in a recent Supreme Court tax case.
In the Home Concrete case,20 the Court invalidated an amended
Treasury regulation dealing with the six-year statute of limitations
on assessment in cases of substantial omissions of income.21 In the
course of its analysis, a four-justice dissent remarked: “Our legal system presumes there will be continuing dialogue among the three
branches of Government on questions of statutory interpretation
and application.” 22
Unsurprisingly, Justice Scalia rose to defend his textualist sensibilities. He addressed and rejected the dissenters’ “romantic, judgeempowering image” and “mirage” of a legislative-executive-judicial
troika.23 He found the dissenters’ vision to be “obliterated” by Vermont Yankee, whose teaching Justice Scalia took to be that “Congress
prescribes and we [the Court] obey, with no discretion to add to the
administrative procedures that Congress has created.” 24
I share Justice Scalia’s belief that in tax (and other statutory areas) a clear congressional command controls, unless unconstitutional
and until Congress amends its direction. But his argument about
constitutional primacy may have missed the point about practical
realities. Congress is not hermetically sealed off from other legal actors. The elected Senators and Representatives are influenced by
values and norms molded and expressed by judges who decide tax
cases, Executive Branch officials who suggest and testify as to tax
legislation, Congress’s staffs of tax professionals, the tax professionals who lobby Congress on behalf of their clients, and, of course, the

law is particularly prolific in connection with federal taxation . . . .” (quoting RANDOLPH
PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 2 n.2 (1938))); Charlotte Crane, Pollock,
Macomber, and the Role of the Federal Courts in the Development of the Income Tax in the
United States, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 (2010) (“Although the income tax is quintessentially a matter of statute, a significant number of its doctrines are entirely a matter
of judicial definition.”).
18. Initially, decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals (the predecessor of the Tax Court)
were reviewed without any deference. This established a “habit” of free-wheeling review.
During those early years, “[p]recedents had accumulated in which courts had laid down
many rules of taxation not based on statute but upon their ideas of right accounting or tax
practice. It was difficult to shift to a new basis.” Dobson, 320 U.S. at 497-98.
19. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 17; Martin D. Ginsburg, Making Tax Law Through the
Judicial Process, 70 A.B.A. J. 74 (1984).
20. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
21. See I.R.C. § 6501(e).
22. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1852 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 1848 (Scalia, J., concurring).
24. Id. (construing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978)).
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clients themselves who are Senators’ and Representatives’ constituents and contributors.
The values fought for and held by the many actors in the tax
community are the womb from which tax laws issue. 25 We turn now
to the key developments that have formed such values in the area of
tax procedure.
B. Shaping Developments
Ruskin, the British author, critic, and social theorist, asserted
that “[g]reat nations write their autobiographies in three manuscripts—the book of their deeds, the book of their words, and the book
of their art.” 26 For Ruskin’s purposes, the book of art was the most
trustworthy. For the purposes of this Article, the book of deeds and
the book of words—that is, what mechanisms we have created in tax
procedure and why we have said they needed to be created—are particularly illuminating. The norms governing the current federal tax
procedure system—and the criteria that should govern reform efforts—crystallized as a result of a long skein of legislative, regulatory, and judicial events.
In rough chronological order, the key events—the Defining Dozen—have included the following: (1) adapting the common law in the
1800s to fashion a refund remedy for taxpayers and the progressive
expansion of that remedy over more than a century; 2) enactment of
the Anti-Injunction Act in 186727 and creation of increasing numbers
of statutory and judicial exceptions to it; (3) establishment, beginning
in the 1920s, of prepayment administrative (and later judicial) remedies for taxpayers as to income and some other taxes;28 (4) the 1960
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Flora II,29 requiring
full payment of liabilities determined by the IRS as prerequisite to a
taxpayer’s bringing a refund suit; (5) the Supreme Court’s 1964
decision in Powell, 30 establishing standards to govern judicial
challenges to IRS summonses and subsequent statutory elaboration
of additional rules;31 (6) enactment of the Federal Tax Lien Act of
25. See generally LOUIS EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION (1961); see also
William L. Cary, Pressure Groups and the Revenue Code: A Requiem in Honor of the Departing Uniformity of the Tax Laws, 68 HARV. L. REV. 745, 746, 773-80 (1955); Stanley S.
Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist—How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70
HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1146, 1181-82 (1957).
26. JOHN RUSKIN, ST. MARK’S REST: THE HISTORY OF VENICE (New York, John Wiley
& Sons 1877) (author’s preface).
27. Currently codified at I.R.C. § 7421.
28. HAROLD DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS pt. 1
(1979).
29. Flora II, 362 U.S. 145 (1960).
30. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
31. Id. at 57-58; see, e.g., I.R.C. § 7609.
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1966 32 with subsequent statutory amendments and promulgation of
extensive regulations; (7) the Supreme Court’s 1976 Shapiro and
Laing decisions, 33 followed by enactment of administrative and judicial mechanisms for prompt review of jeopardy and termination assessments;34 (8) enactment of the unified partnership audit and litigation procedures in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982 (“TEFRA”); 35 (9) the Supreme Court’s 1997 Brockamp decision 36
and its partial reversal by legislation allowing limited equitable tolling of the statute of limitations on filing refund claims; 37 (10) enactment of numerous tax procedure changes in the Internal Revenue
Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998; 38 (11) the Supreme
Court’s 2005 Ballard decision 39 dealing with Tax Court opinion practice; and (12) the irreversible entry of principles of general administrative law into tax litigation, reflected in part in the Supreme
Court’s 2011 Mayo decision. 40
Others might constitute the list differently. Clearly, there have
been other important developments in federal tax procedure in the
past century. I selected the Defining Dozen developments because
they deal with rights and obligations as between the IRS and taxpayers. It is from these matters that criteria useful to reforming federal
tax litigation are most likely to emerge.
1. Creation and Expansion of Refund Remedies
“In present times, federal income taxes are of such a pervasive
and significant influence that it is easy to forget their relatively recent origin.”41 For most of this country’s history, the federal government assumed limited responsibilities, and so could do with limited
revenue, mostly supplied by tariffs, sale of public lands, and various
excise taxes.42
32. Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (codified at I.R.C.
§§ 6323-6325).
33. Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614 (1976); Laing v. United States, 423 U.S.
161 (1976).
34. See I.R.C. § 7429.
35. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324.
36. United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347 (1997).
37. I.R.C. § 6511(h).
38. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105206, 112 Stat. 685 (codified in various sections of the I.R.C.).
39. Ballard v. Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40 (2005).
40. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704
(2011).
41. DUBROFF, supra note 28, at 1 (1979).
42. The idea of an income tax was not unknown, however. As early as 1643, the New
Plymouth colony had a rudimentary income tax, and some other colonies and states also
imposed income taxes in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Id. at 1-2.
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Nonetheless, it is surprising, perhaps shocking, to contemporary
sensibilities that until 1855 no suit as to tax overpayments was permitted against the federal government. 43 That caused lawyers and
judges to do what they usually do when confronted by an inadequate
statutory framework—use their creativity to fashion an alternative
remedy. The constraint, of course, was the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. The answer fashioned by the courts—upheld by the Supreme Court in 1936—was allowing federal tax collectors 44 to be sued
personally for taxes allegedly collected illegally. 45 “Such a suit
was based on the common-law [action] of assumpsit for money had
and received . . . .” 46
This device was built on a fiction. 47 The real party in interest was
the government, not the collector. 48 Much of the law involves fiction,
of course, but a regime based on dubious premises often leads to convolution erected on convolution as doctrine is expounded. So it was
with this fiction.
There were at least three problems with the solution fashioned by
the courts. First, suits against collectors initially depended on diversity jurisdiction. 49 Suit could be barred, therefore, because of acci43. If the taxpayer had not yet paid the tax at issue, she might be able to secure judicial review of the merits by posting bond for the tax, then, when the government brought
suit on the bond, asserting the absence of substantive liability as a defense. In addition,
Congress sometimes determined the merits of tax claims itself via special legislation. See
William T. Plumb, Jr., Tax Refund Suits Against Collectors of Internal Revenue, 60 HARV.
L. REV. 685, 687 (1947).
44. For discussion of the role of collectors in federal taxation during the nineteenth
century, see Bryan T. Camp, Theory and Practice in Tax Administration, 29 VA. TAX REV.
227, 229-43 (2009).
45. Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137, 159 (1836). Elliott was a customs case.
The “sue the collector” remedy was held to apply as well in tax cases. City of Philadelphia
v. Collector, 75 U.S. (5 Wall.) 720, 730-33 (1866).
46. Flora II, 362 U.S. 145, 153 (1960). This common law action should be distinguished from a taxpayer suit on account stated, which is available when the IRS fails to
make a stipulated refund. See, e.g., Bonwit Teller & Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 258, 259
(1931); MARVIN J. GARBIS, RONALD B. RUBIN & PATRICIA T. MORGAN, TAX PROCEDURE AND
TAX FRAUD: CASES AND MATERIALS 420-21 (3d ed. 1992).
47. “A suit against a Collector who has collected a tax in the fulfillment of a ministerial duty is today an anomalous relic of bygone modes of thought. . . . [Although t]here may
have been utility in such procedural devices in days when the Government was not suable
as freely as now. . . [t]hey have little utility today.” George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose,
289 U.S. 373, 382-83 (1933).
48. The office of “Collector” has since been abolished. When the office existed, there
was a collector for each district. “When the Commissioner [of Internal Revenue] certifie[d]
an assessment to the collector, that official ha[d] a purely ministerial duty to effect its collection.” Plumb, supra note 43, at 687; see also Erskine v. Hohnbach, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.)
613, 616 (1871) (holding that “[t]he collector could not revise nor refuse to enforce the assessment regularly made”).
49. Collector v. Hubbard, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 1, 8 (1870). Subsequently, Congress established jurisdiction for “all causes arising under any law providing internal revenue.” Rev.
Stat. § 629(4) (1874) (current version codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1340).
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dents of residency. Second, notice of the alleged illegality was held to
be an essential element of an action against a collector, requiring
that the taxpayer have paid the amount in question under protest. 50
This created a trap for the unwary.51 The taxpayer who neglected this
formality would be nonsuited. 52 Third, underlining the fiction, collectors were initially indemnified by the government for amounts for
which they were held personally liable. 53 This led to the practice of
collectors withholding amounts from collected taxes to provide cushion against the possibility of being held liable. In turn, this led to
theft by collectors 54 and caused Congress in 1839 to prohibit the practice without creating an alternative indemnification mechanism. 55
This had an unintended consequence. The Supreme Court viewed
a reliable indemnification procedure as fundamental to the common
law remedy. The Court held that the remedy could not survive the
removal of this foundation. 56 Justices Story and McLean filed separate dissents, arguing in part that taxpayers could not constitutionally be deprived of all judicial remedies for recovery of illegal or excessive taxes. There being no other remedy, they maintained, suits
against collectors could not be abolished. 57
Congress reacted quickly. Within a few weeks, it passed a sostyled “explanatory Act” declaring that the 1839 legislation should
not be understood as impairing the rights of persons to sue collectors. 58 The Court was satisfied; suits against collectors were rehabilitated as a remedy. 59 But, given the legislation, the Supreme Court
“no longer regarded the suit as a common-law action, but rather as
a statutory remedy which ‘in its nature [was] a remedy against
the Government.’ ” 60

50. Elliott, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at 153-54.
51. This ran contrary to “[t]he ideal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and of all
modern code pleading . . . that a party who has timely brought a suit in a court having
jurisdiction shall not be defeated by mere procedural technicalities.” Plumb, supra note 43,
at 685.
52. The federal government abolished the “paid under protest” requirement in 1924.
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 1014, 43 Stat. 253, 343.
53. Rev. Stat. § 989 (1875); see, e.g., George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S.
373, 380-81 (1933).
54. See Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 243 (1845) (noting that the practice “led
to great abuses, and to much loss to the public”).
55. Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 82, § 2, 5 Stat. 339, 348-49 (1839).
56. Cary, 44. U.S. (3 How.) at 243-44.
57. Id. at 252-56 (Story, J., dissenting), 263-66 (McLean, J., dissenting).
58. Act of Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 22, 5 Stat. 727 (1845).
59. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Collector, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 720, 731 (1866).
60. Flora II, 362 U.S. 145, 153 (1960) (quoting Curtis’s Adm’x v. Fiedler, 67 U.S. (2
Black) 461, 479 (1862)).
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Congress created a second refund remedy when it established the
Court of Claims in 1855.61 That body originated as an administrative
or advisory body but was elevated to judicial status, with jurisdiction
to hear claims against the federal government, including tax claims. 62
Next, in 1887, Congress created another refund action in the
Tucker Act. It conferred on federal district courts jurisdiction to hear
claims against the United States not exceeding $1000.63 Taxpayers
with larger refund claims could sue either the United States in the
Court of Claims or the collector in district court. The utility of that
second alternative was impaired, however, when the Supreme Court
held that an action against a collector was personal in character and
could not, in the event of the particular collector’s death or other vacation of office, be maintained against her successor.64 Congress responded to that holding by amending the statute to remove the ceiling amount in the event that the collector to whom the tax was paid
was not in office when the suit was commenced.65
These historical artifacts have now been tidied up. Refund suits
against collectors have been abolished.66 Instead, tax refund claims
may be brought against the federal government in either the Court of
Federal Claims (the current iteration of the Court of Claims) or federal district court, without any ceiling on the amount sought. 67
This history was driven by the desire to provide taxpayers effective remedies. Congress’ failure to so provide in early years impelled
the courts to create a common law remedy, however unwieldy. Limitations on that judicial remedy spurred Congress to improve statutory remedies progressively.
2. The Anti-Injunction Act and Its Exceptions
As we have just seen, taxpayers had the ability through refund
suits to attempt to secure the return of taxes allegedly improperly
collected by the federal government. But were taxpayers remitted to
only this “back end” remedy? Lawyers are fond of seeking injunctions. Instead of paying the tax then trying for a refund, could tax61. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612.
62. See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 562-65 (1933); United States v. Klein,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 144-45 (1871).
63. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, § 2, 24 Stat. 505. This was held to include jurisdiction
over tax refund claims. United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty Co., 237 U.S. 28, 32
(1915).
64. Smietanka v. Ind. Steel Co., 257 U.S. 1, 6 (1921).
65. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 1310, 42 Stat. 227, 310. The amount-incontroversy ceiling was abolished entirely in 1954. Act of July 30, 1954, ch. 648, § 1, 68
Stat. 589, 589.
66. See Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-713, § 3, 80 Stat. 1107, 1108.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (2006).
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payers obtain earlier judicial determination of the merits of a particular case by bringing an injunction action against impending tax assessment or collection?
From an early date—essentially contemporaneous with the abolition of the income tax imposed by the Union during the Civil War 68—
Congress answered that question in the negative. In 1867, it enacted
the earliest version of the Anti-Injunction Act (“AIA”). 69 The current
version of the Act, embodied in I.R.C. § 7421(a), 70 provides, in the
main, that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person,
whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax
was assessed.” 71
The AIA was adopted by voice vote as a floor amendment and so
was not accompanied by committee reports. Nonetheless, the text of
the statute makes the provision’s purpose plain enough. 72 “This statute protects the Government’s ability to collect a consistent stream of
revenue . . . . Because of the [AIA], taxes can ordinarily be challenged
only after they are paid, by suing for a refund.” 73 This understanding
has existed essentially from the original enactment of the statute. 74
This strong “protect the revenue” measure has been modified by
both Congress and the Supreme Court, however. Congress has
amended § 7421 from time to time to allow injunction actions when
the IRS proceeds with assessment or collection in disregard of statutorily prescribed taxpayer remedies and protections. 75
68. For description of the Civil War income tax, see INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
supra note 2, at 10-15.
69. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, Pub. L. No. 39-169, § 10, 14 Stat. 471, 475.
70. A parallel prohibition exists in I.R.C. § 7421(b) as to suits to restrain assessment
or collection of transferee or fiduciary liabilities.
71. I.R.C. § 7421(a). Taxpayers or third parties seeking injunctions sometimes also
desire judicial declaration of the illegality of the tax rule or its application in the particular
case. Just as the AIA can be a barrier to an injunction, the Declaratory Judgment Act
(“DJA”) can be a barrier to a declaration. The DJA withdraws authority from federal courts
to grant declaratory relief in tax cases. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006). The courts typically hold
that the AIA and the DJA are coextensive. See, e.g., Sigmon Coal Co. v. Apfel, 226 F.3d
291, 299 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d 573, 583 (4th Cir.
1996)).
72. Even textualist judges use statutory purpose, as long as such purpose can be derived from the statute itself and its context, rather than from suspect committee reports.
See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 56-58 (2012).
73. Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2582 (2012).
74. See Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189, 192 (1883); Taylor v. Secor, 92 U.S. 575, 61215 (1875).
75. Specifically, I.R.C. § 7421(a) allows injunction suits as provided in § 6015(e) (Tax
Court review of spousal relief cases), §§ 6212(a), (c), 6213(a) (Tax Court review of deficiency
actions), §§ 6225(b), 6246(b) (TEFRA proceedings), § 6330(e)(1) (collection due process
cases), § 6331(i) (levies as to divisible taxes), § 6672(c) (trust fund recovery penalty
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In addition, the Supreme Court created judicial exceptions to the
AIA. Initially, the Court held that an injunction action will lie if all
three of these conditions are satisfied: (1) under the most pro-IRS
view of the facts and the law, there is no possibility that the IRS
could prevail on the merits in the controversy; (2) the taxpayer is
threatened with irreparable harm; and (3) no adequate legal remedy
is available to the taxpayer. 76
Later, taking a purposive tack, the Court created a second exception. Under it, the AIA will bar injunction actions “only in situations
in which Congress ha[s] provided the aggrieved party with an alternative legal avenue by which to contest the legality of a particular tax.” 77
A recent prominent appearance of the AIA was in NFIB, which
tested the constitutionality of the individual mandate provision of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Holding that the shared
responsibility payment (which enforces the mandate) constitutes a
penalty, not a tax, for statutory purposes, the Court held that the AIA
did not prevent on-the-merits review of the constitutional issues.78
This chapter in our story reflects a dominant revenue protection
purpose, of course. Dominant, but not unmixed. The AIA does not
prevent all challenges to tax assessment and collection, just injunctions. The presence of an alternative taxpayer remedy—refund
suits—is what makes prohibiting injunctions politically and constitutionally palatable. 79 Moreover, Congress has withdrawn even the
prohibition on injunctions when necessary to maintain the integrity
of a variety of protections for taxpayers and third parties. The judicial exceptions—although limited 80—further evince the system’s desire to protect the revenue only in cases of genuine necessity.
3. Creation of Prepayment Remedies
National crises, especially wars, transform societies. Among other
effects, America’s participation in World War I caused the federal
income and profits taxes to emerge as the federal government’s pribonds), § 6694(c) (preparer penalty), § 7426(a), (b)(1) (wrongful levy and other suits),
§ 7429(b) (jeopardy and termination assessment review), and § 7436 (employment status
determinations).
76. See Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 510-11 (1932), overruled
by Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 6 (1962).
77. South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 373 (1984).
78. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2583-84; id. at 2656 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ.,
dissenting); see Steve R. Johnson, It’s Not a Tax (Statutorily), but It Is a Tax (Constitutionally), 32 A.B.A. SEC. TAX’N NEWS Q. 13 (2012).
79. See infra Part II.B.7.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 14 (2008)
(holding that the Williams Packing exception applies only when the taxpayer’s claim is “so
obvious that the Government [would have] no chance of prevailing [on the merits]”).
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mary means of finance. 81 This emergence created great stress on the
then Bureau of Internal Revenue because, first, the taxes were highly
conceptually complex and, second, numerous taxpayers were swept
into the net when the income tax graduated from a class tax to a
mass tax.
Taxpayers who disagreed with the Bureau’s determination of their
tax liability had the judicial remedies described in Part II.B.1, of
course. But the absence of a pre-assessment remedy soon became a
sore point. The first such remedy was administrative. In 1918, Congress confirmed and extended 1917 authority by creating an Advisory
Tax Board, whose members were appointed by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue with approval of the Secretary of the Treasury.82
The Commissioner could on his own authority, and was required to
on request by the taxpayer, submit to the Board any question as to
interpretation or administration of income, war profits, or excess
profits tax.83 In 1921, Congress required the Bureau to give the taxpayer notice of its intention to assess income tax and an opportunity
to file an appeal with the Bureau’s Committee on Appeals and Review within thirty days of the notice. 84
Not surprisingly, some believed that taxpayers could not get a
“square deal” while the appellate unit remained within the Bureau
itself. 85 Accordingly, in 1924 Congress created the Board of Tax Appeals as an independent agency within the Executive Branch to hear
appeals from deficiency determinations by the Bureau. Decisions by
the Board were appealable to federal district court. 86
In 1942, Congress renamed the Board the “Tax Court of the United States,” although it continued to be an independent agency in the
Executive Branch, with its jurisdiction, powers, and duties unaltered.87 Finally, in 1969, Congress ended the tribunal’s status as an
agency. It “established, under article I of the Constitution of the
United States, a court of record to be known as the United States Tax
Court.” 88 As it is currently constituted, “[t]he Tax Court’s function
81. For discussion of this emergence, see DUBROFF, supra note 28, at 1-12, and David
Laro, The Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 17,
19-22.
82. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 1301(d)(1), 40 Stat. 1057, 1141.
83. Id. § 1301(d)(2), 40 Stat. at 1141; see Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States,
277 U.S. 551, 562 n.7 (1928).
84. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 250(d), 42 Stat. 227, 255-56.
85. 62 CONG. REC. 8913-14 (1922) (statement of Sen. Pomerene); see also DUBROFF,
supra note 28, at 58 (noting “the widespread belief that the Committee maintained a policy
of resolving all doubts against the taxpayer”).
86. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 900, 43 Stat. 253, 336-38, amended by
Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, § 1000-05, 44 Stat. 9, 105-11.
87. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 504, 56 Stat. 798, 957.
88. I.R.C. § 7441.
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and role in the federal judicial scheme closely resemble those of the
federal district courts . . . .” 89 Its decisions are appealable to the circuit courts “in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions
of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury.” 90
This chapter in the saga of federal tax procedure is clear. The reasons for the creation of the prepayment remedy initially and for its
evolution into greater independence and institutional dignity are evident. Congress was animated by notions of confidence, competence,
and consistency. The confidence of the public in the fairness of the
process was bolstered by the formalization of the Tax Court as a
court, a tribunal separate from the IRS. 91 The competence of the tribunal to decide tax controversies fairly and correctly would be promoted by the tax experience of the members selected for it and their
specialized tax dockets. 92 Consistency—nationwide uniformity in interpretation and application of the tax laws—also was hoped to result
from the Tax Court’s nationwide jurisdiction. 93
4. Flora Full Payment Rule
Part II.B.1 above traced the development of federal refund litigation remedies. An important question remained, however: was full
payment of the assessed amount necessary before a refund case could
be brought? For instance, assume the IRS has assessed $50,000 of
additional income tax liability against Abigail. Can she pay only
$20,000 (or even $100) of that amount and sue for refund of it? Or is
Abigail precluded from bringing suit until she pays the full $50,000?
The lower courts were divided.94 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. In Flora I, with only one justice dissent89. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 891 (1991).
90. I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1).
91. John Nance Garner, then ranking Democrat on the House Ways and Means
Committee, expressed the common concern that, as long as members of the reviewing body
were subject to the Treasury Department, “if they did not decide cases to suit [the Treasury
Secretary] he could kick them out and get somebody who would.” 65 CONG. REC. 3282
(1924).
92. For a while, Tax Court decisions were given greater influential weight than other
decisions of lower courts because of this expertise. See, e.g., Dobson v. Commissioner, 320
U.S. 489, 498-502 (1943) (contrasting the “long legislative or administrative [tax] experience” of Tax Court judges to “the lack of a roundly tax-informed viewpoint of [generalist]
judges”), abrogated in part by I.R.C. § 7482.
93. For this reason, the Tax Court originally took the position that when its sense of
the law differed from that of the circuit court to which the case would be appealable, it
would continue to adhere to its view despite the relevant circuit’s contrary view. Lawrence
v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 713, 716-20 (1957). The Tax Court later abandoned that position,
deferring to the controlling circuit even when that meant that substantively identical cases
would be decided inconsistently because they were within different circuits. Golsen v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 756-58 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971).
94. Compare Flora v. United States, 246 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1957), aff’g 142 F. Supp.
602 (D. Wyo. 1956), and Suhr v. United States, 18 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1927) (holding that full
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ing (in a dissent of only one paragraph), the Court held in favor of the
full payment view. 95 The majority’s opinion turned mainly on statutory interpretation and precedent, not policy. It affirmed what it called
“carefully considered dictum” in one of its 1876 decisions. 96
The majority saw the contrary lower court cases as interlopers. In
its view, the full payment “understanding of the statutory scheme
appears to have prevailed for the succeeding fifty or sixty years” after
1876.97 Thus, “there does not appear to be a single case before 1940 in
which a taxpayer attempted a suit for refund of income taxes without
paying the full amount the Government alleged to be due.” 98 This assertion was important because a long settled tradition of consistent
interpretation is a powerful consideration of statutory construction.99
The Court’s historical assertions were inaccurate. As the Government later conceded, there were in fact pre-1940 cases in which taxpayers sued for refunds without having fully paid the assessment
and without the Government or the court objecting to this omission. 100 Accordingly, the Court granted rehearing.
Flora II, decided in 1960, was a much more searching exploration.
Again the Court held in favor of the full payment approach, but only
by five-to-four, with a much longer majority opinion, one long dissent,
and one short dissent. 101
As befits the closeness of the vote, the majority acknowledged the
closeness of the merits.102 As supporting a partial payment approach,
the majority noted that suits against collectors 103 could be maintained without full payment and that there was an “absence of any
conclusive evidence that Congress ha[d] ever intended to inaugurate
a new rule.” 104
payment is necessary), with Bushmiaer v. United States, 230 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1956),
Sirian Lamp Co. v. Manning, 123 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1941), and Coates v. United States, 111
F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1940) (holding that partial payment suffices).
95. Flora I, 357 U.S. 63 (1958).
96. Id. at 68 (discussing Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85 (1876)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 69.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 219-20
(2001); Flora II, 362 U.S. 145, 177-78 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[I]n construing
a tax law it has been my rule to follow almost blindly accepted understanding of the meaning of tax legislation, when that is manifested by long-continued, uniform practice, unless a
statute leaves no admissible opening for administrative construction.”).
100. Although there was some wrangling over precisely how many such cases there
were, there were at least two in the Supreme Court and a number in the lower courts. See
Flora II, 362 U.S. at 181-85 (citing Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170 (1926);
Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924), and various lower court decisions).
101. Flora II, 362 U.S. 145.
102. Id. at 152.
103. See supra Part II.B.1.
104. Flora II, 362 U.S. at 157.
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In favor of the full payment predicate, the majority enlisted its
view of the 1876 decision, a 1921 statutory amendment, and—
decisively—the “carefully articulated and quite complicated structure
of tax laws.” 105 The majority perceived “that Congress ha[d] several
times acted upon the assumption that [the Code] requires full payment before suit,” 106 these times being the establishment of the Board
of Tax Appeals and the enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act
and § 7422(e) of the Code. 107 Although giving primary attention to
statutory construction, the majority also invoked several policy arguments, including concerns about claim splitting, 108 allocation of
caseloads between the Tax Court and refund fora, 109 and erosion of
revenue collection. 110
In contrast, the dissenters expressed their “deep and abiding conviction that the Court today departs from the plain direction of Congress . . . , defeats its beneficent purpose, and repudiates many
soundly reasoned opinions of the federal courts . . . .” 111 The dissenters read the statutes and precedents differently from the majority,
and they disagreed at the level of policy as well. Specifically, the dissent maintained that a partial payment rule would not hamper tax
collection, 112 but it would avoid “great hardships” by allowing suits by
those lacking the resources to pay fully before litigating.113
The full payment rule has been settled since Flora II, but there
are exceptions and ambiguities. For example, the taxpayer’s liability
may include as many as three components: the deficiency, interest on
the deficiency, and one or more penalties. To satisfy Flora II, the taxpayer must fully pay the deficiency, of course, but must she also pay
all the interest and/or all the penalties? The Supreme Court has not
addressed the issue, and lower court decisions have been divided.114

105. Id.
106. Id. (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1)).
107. Id. at 158-67.
108. Id. at 165-66.
109. Id. at 176.
110. Id. at 169 n.36, 176 n.41.
111. Id. at 178 (Whittaker, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 194-95.
113. Id. at 195, 198.
114. Compare Horkey v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 259, 260-61 (D. Minn. 1989)
(payment of penalty required), with Kell-Strom Tool Co. v. United States, 205 F. Supp. 190,
194 (D. Conn. 1962) (payment of interest and penalties not required). See also Martin M.
Lore & L. Paige Marvel, Claims Court Does About Face on Flora Full-Payment Rule, 78 J.
TAX’N 81, 81 (1993); Erika L. Robinson, Note, Refund Suits in Claims Court: Jurisdiction
and the Flora Full-Payment Rule After Shore v. United States, 46 TAX LAW. 827, 831-34
(1993) (describing four different views of the issue announced within a two-year period by
the Claims Court).
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An important exception applies to so-called divisible taxes, that is,
taxes based on separate transactions the assessments of which occur
separately. Prominent examples include withholding taxes and the
related trust fund recovery penalty under § 6672. 115 One facing the
penalty can secure judicial review by paying the amount attributable
to one employee for each calendar quarter at issue and posting a
bond. The government will then counterclaim for the amounts attributable to the remaining employees.116
What values does this episode reflect? Since the Flora cases are
primarily about statutory interpretation and precedent, the values of
congressional primacy and stability in taxation are much in evidence.
Process efficiency also is implicated. So are revenue protection and
provision of effective taxpayer remedies—with no clear winner between the two. Revenue protection was a policy invoked by the majority, but that should not be overemphasized. The justices were closely
divided. Moreover, the majority thought that the availability of prepayment Tax Court review ameliorated the concern about erosion of
the refund remedy by enshrining a full payment predicate. 117 Thus,
the majority did not see a sharp conflict between revenue protection
and provision of effective taxpayer remedies.
5. Powell and IRS Information Gathering
As Bacon observed, “knowledge itself is power.” 118 The IRS cannot
test the accuracy of taxpayers’ returns without the ability to gather
information on taxpayers’ transactions. Thus, Congress has granted
the IRS authority “[t]o examine any books, papers, records, or other
data which may be relevant or material to such inquiry,” and to
summon taxpayers and third parties to give testimony under oath or
produce “such books, papers, records, or other data . . . as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.”119
But the IRS’s need for information must be balanced with taxpayers’ interest in avoiding unnecessarily burdensome examinations.120
Thus, the Code contains a number of provisions to prevent undue in115. See also Susan V. Sample & Samira A. Salman, Tax Shelter Penalties: Are They
Divisible? Or Does the Taxpayer Have to Pay the Balance Before Litigating?, 4 HOUS. BUS.
& TAX L.J. 447, 455-58 (2004).
116. I.R.C. § 6672(c).
117. Flora II, 362 U.S. at 175.
118. FRANCIS BACON, RELIGIOUS MEDITATIONS (1597), reprinted in 7 THE WORKS OF
FRANCIS BACON 243, 253 (James Spedding et. al. eds., Garrett Press 1968).
119. I.R.C. § 7602(a)(1)-(2).
120. For an excellent description of the history and premises of IRS information gathering in general, and of the summons power in particular, see Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring
and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2004).
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trusion. These provisions: (1) require that the times and places of examination be “reasonable under the circumstances;” 121 (2) control audio recording of interviews; 122 (3) require the IRS to explain the audit
process and the taxpayer’s rights in it; 123 (4) limit IRS summonses
when the Department of Justice has entered the case;124 (5) prohibit
the IRS from using especially detailed financial status inquiry programs absent reasonable indication that there is a likelihood the taxpayer has unreported income; 125 (6) impose special restrictions on tax
investigations of churches; 126 (7) establish rules as to IRS contacts
with third parties; 127 (8) heighten requirements when the IRS seeks
sensitive computer information; 128 (9) give taxpayers intervention
rights when the IRS summonses information from third parties;129
and (10) create requirements for the enforcement of “John Doe”
summonses.130 The IRS has established additional protections as a
matter of administrative policy. 131
One of the early protective provisions is § 7605(b), enacted originally in 1921. 132 In current form, the section provides that taxpayers
shall not “be subjected to unnecessary examination or investigations”
and that taxpayers’ “books of account” shall be subject to only
one inspection for each tax year unless the IRS “after investigation,
notifies the taxpayer in writing that an additional inspection is
necessary.” 133 The floor manager of the 1921 bill justified the
measure thusly:
Since these income taxes and direct taxes have been in force very
general complaint has been made . . . at the repeated visits of tax
examiners, who perhaps are overzealous. . . . [F]rom many of the
cities of the country very bitter complaints have reached me . . . of
unnecessary visits and inquisitions. . . . This section is purely in
the interest of quieting all this trouble and in the interest of the
peace of mind of the honest taxpayer. 134

121. I.R.C. § 7605(a).
122. Id. § 7521(a).
123. Id. § 7521(b)(1).
124. Id. § 7602(d)(1).
125. Id. § 7602(e).
126. Id. § 7611(b).
127. Id. § 7602(c).
128. Id. § 7609(a).
129. Id. § 7609(b)(1).
130. Id. § 7609(f).
131. See, e.g., IRS Establishes Five-Year Duration on Continuous Audits of Taxpayers,
25 TAX MGMT. WKLY. REP. 1811, 1811 (2006).
132. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 1309, 42 Stat. 227, 310.
133. I.R.C. § 7605(b).
134. 61 CONG. REC. 5855 (1921) (statement of Sen. Penrose).
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The interplay of § 7605(b) and the IRS’s summons was at the
heart of Powell, 135 the most important case in our history as to the
scope of the IRS’s investigatory power. Although the IRS issues
summonses during relatively few examinations, the summons power
lies behind all IRS information gathering. Taxpayers understand
that, if they do not respond to informal IRS requests for information,
the IRS has the ability to proceed to a summons.
In Powell, the IRS was examining two income tax returns of a
company of which Powell was the president. 136 The IRS summoned
Powell to give testimony and produce records.137 Powell declined because the IRS had already examined the returns once before and because the normal statute of limitations on assessing deficiencies as to
those returns had already expired (although the limitations period
remained open if the returns were fraudulent). 138 Powell maintained
that, before he could be forced to respond, it was incumbent on the
IRS to state grounds for believing that the returns reflected fraud.139
The IRS refused to do so. 140 The Government brought an action in
district court to enforce the summons,141 and the district court held
for the Government. 142
The Third Circuit reversed.143 It reasoned that, because the returns could be adjusted only if fraudulent, § 7605(b)’s prohibition of
“unnecessary examination” barred reexamination of the records unless the IRS had information “which might cause a reasonable man to
suspect that there has been fraud in the return for the otherwise
closed year.” 144
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of conflict among
the circuits as to the standards the IRS must meet in order to obtain
judicial enforcement of its summonses.145 Although it acknowledged
that a standard resembling the stringency of the circuit court’s test
135. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
136. Id. at 49.
137. Id.
138. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 6501(a) (three-year “general” limitations period), (c)(1) (infinite limitations period in case of fraud).
139. Powell, 379 U.S. at 49.
140. Id.
141. Id. IRS summonses are not self-enforcing. In general, when a taxpayer does not
comply with a summons, the Government must seek an order of enforcement. If that order
is granted and not complied with, contempt of court sanctions follow. See, e.g., Reisman v.
Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 446 (1964).
142. Powell, 379 U.S. at 50.
143. Id.
144. United States v. Powell, 325 F.2d. 914, 915-16 (3d Cir. 1963), rev’d, 379 U.S. 48
(1964).
145. The conflicting circuit court cases are identified at Powell, 379 U.S. at 50, 51 & n.8.

2013]

REFORMING FEDERAL TAX LITIGATION

225

was “possible,” 146 a 6-to-3 majority of the Court held that the IRS
“need make no showing of probable cause to suspect fraud unless
the taxpayer raises a substantial question that judicial enforcement
of the administrative summons would be an abusive use of the
court’s process.” 147
The majority supported its holding by reference to cases rejecting
probable cause requirements as to summonses and subpoenas issued
by other federal agencies. 148 Clearly, however, the fulcrum was the
majority’s fear that a rigorous standard “might seriously hamper the
[IRS] in carrying out investigations [it] thinks warranted.”149
In place of probable cause, the Powell Court erected the standard
that has controlled summons enforcement cases ever since. It consists of an initial burden on the IRS, satisfaction of which causes the
burden going forward to shift to the taxpayer. 150
The Government’s prima facie case consists of its establishing
(typically by affidavit of the IRS examining agent) four matters: “that
the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose,
that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the information
sought is not already within the [IRS’s] possession, and that the administrative steps required by the Code have been followed.” 151 These
elements are minimal, as subsequent cases have underscored. 152
Even if the IRS establishes these elements, the taxpayer or other
summoned party may still “ ‘challenge the summons on any appropriate ground.’ ” 153 Illustratively, the Court noted that enforcement
would be an abuse of process “if the summons had been issued for an
improper purpose, such as to harass the taxpayer or to put pressure
on him to settle a collateral dispute, or for any other purpose reflecting on the good faith of the particular investigation.” 154
The dominant impulse behind Powell was protection of the revenue, based on the centrality of information to IRS examination and
enforcement. However, this impulse is tempered by the second stage
146. Id. at 53.
147. Id. at 51.
148. Id. at 57 (citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950);
Okla. Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 216 (1946)). For discussion of these and related cases, see Steve R. Johnson, Reasonable Relation Reassessed: The Examination of
Private Documents by Federal Regulatory Agencies, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 742 (1981).
149. Powell, 379 U.S. at 54; see also id. at 56 (“For us to import a probable cause standard to be enforced by the courts would substantially overshoot the goal which [Congress]
sought to attain.”).
150. Id. at 57-58.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Tex. Heart Inst., 755 F.2d 469, 474 (5th Cir. 1985).
153. Powell, 379 U.S. at 58 (quoting Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964)).
154. Id.
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of the Powell test, as explained above. Moreover, the context must be
considered. Summons enforcement is not a determination of the merits. 155 A pro-IRS doctrine at the investigation stage is tolerable as
long as fair procedures are employed in the ensuing determination on
the merits. Indeed, Powell merely reduces informational asymmetry
between the parties, so that administrative and judicial determinations on the merits can be made on something approaching a level
playing field.
6. Federal Tax Lien Act
Assessment is a crucial act in federal taxation. Assessment is a
mere mechanical act, essentially “a bookkeeping notation” by which
the IRS fixes a dollar amount of liability for a particular period of a
particular tax for a particular taxpayer. 156 But this mechanical act
has great legal significance: the IRS has no legal authority to engage
in enforced collection actions until there has been a valid assessment. 157 For the assessment to be valid, all preliminary steps prescribed by the Code must have been accomplished.
Once the assessment has been made, the IRS bills the taxpayer
for any amount not yet paid. If the taxpayer does not “voluntarily”
pay in response to the bill, the IRS may engage in enforced collection.
The IRS’s collection powers far exceed those of private creditors.158
Among the IRS’s collection tools are tax liens,159 filing notices of tax
liens,160 levies on and administrative sale of property, 161 instigation of
judicial sale of property, 162 and offsetting tax debts against otherwise
due tax refunds. 163
Pre-assessment issues get much more attention from tax practitioners and scholars than do post-assessment issues. Nonetheless,
the latter have great practical significance, not only for the taxpayers
155. See id. at 54 (noting the dubious wisdom of “forcing [the IRS] to litigate and prosecute appeals on the very subject which [it] desires to investigate”).
156. Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 170 n.13 (1976); see I.R.C. § 6203.
157. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6322, 6331(a).
158. See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, The IRS as Super Creditor, 92 TAX NOTES 655, 655
(2001).
159. The general federal tax lien attaches to “all property and rights to property” of the
tax delinquent. I.R.C. § 6321. A variety of special tax liens also exist. See, e.g., id.
§§ 6324(a) (estate taxes), 6324(b) (gift taxes), 6324A (estate taxes deferred under § 6166),
6324B (additional estate taxes attributable to property qualifying for special valuation
under § 2032A).
160. See id. § 6323(f). Even before filing, the so-called “secret lien” is effective against
the taxpayer. See, e.g., Don King Prods., Inc. v. Thomas, 945 F.2d 529, 533 (2d Cir. 1991).
161. I.R.C. §§ 6331 (levy, also sometimes called seizure or distraint), 6335 (administrative sale of property levied upon).
162. Id. § 7403.
163. See, e.g., id. § 6402(d).
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themselves but also for third parties. 164 Those who owe money to the
IRS often owe money to others as well, and tax delinquents often coown property with persons who do not have tax debts. Accordingly,
whether and how the IRS proceeds against the property of taxpayers
can have powerful effects on the interests and behavior of third
parties as well.
The steady direction of federal tax collection law has been towards
greater solicitude for the rights and interests of third parties, even to
the point, in some instances, of according third party claims priority
over IRS claims. The Federal Tax Lien Act is the most important
landmark along this road, although neither the first nor the last.
Early on, the law was highly protective of governmental revenues.
Before the modern federal income tax, the Union imposed an income
tax during the Civil War. That earlier income tax, too, was enforced
in part by a tax lien.165 That lien was superior to the interests of third
parties—even if the tax lien had not been filed and even if the third
party was a subsequent bona fide purchaser. 166
However, in ensuing generations, Congress displayed “an increasing awareness of the public importance of security of titles, and of the
need of certain creditors to be able to rely upon the taxpayer’s apparent unencumbered ownership of his property.”167 Part of this awareness was enlightened self-interest. Congress realized that protecting
the interests of third parties in appropriate circumstances can induce
them to engage in economic transactions with the tax delinquent, enhancing the ability of the delinquent to pay the IRS.
Here are some of the steps in the unfolding awareness. In 1913,
Congress accorded priority to purchasers, mortgagees, and judgment
creditors over the IRS when notice of the federal tax lien was not
properly filed in the designated office.168 In 1939, this was extended
to pledgees. 169
In some instances, third parties should be protected even when
the IRS has previously filed notice of its lien, either because searching the records is impracticable under the circumstances or because
certain kinds of transactions should be encouraged. Thus, in 1939,
Congress created superpriorities for some purchasers and for those
164. For example, federal tax liens attach to the tax debtor’s property even if notice of
it is not filed. Filing affects priorities between the IRS and other creditors when the taxpayer has insufficient assets to satisfy all claims against him. See id. § 6323.
165. Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 9, 14 Stat. 98, 107; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch.
78, 13 Stat. 469, 470.
166. See United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893).
167. William T. Plumb, Jr., Federal Liens and Priorities—Agenda for the Next Decade,
77 YALE L.J. 228, 229 (1967).
168. Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 166, 37 Stat. 1016 (reversing Snyder, 149 U.S. 210).
169. Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 247, § 401, 53 Stat. 862, 882-83.
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lending on the security of “securities.” 170 A superpriority for purchasers of motor vehicles was established in 1964. 171
The 1966 Federal Tax Lien Act dwarfed in scope previous expansions of collection protections for third parties. Its origins lay in a
decade-long study project by the American Bar Association. The 1966
Act contained important provisions related to the validity and priority of tax liens as against purchasers, security interest holders, mechanic’s lienors, and judgment creditors; release of tax liens and discharge of property from the reach of the liens; property seizures; release of tax levies and return of property levied upon; and judicial
actions by the government, taxpayers, and third parties as to tax
collection issues.172
A leading figure of the time described the Act thusly:
Congress granted specific relief in a number of meritorious
situations and, on the whole, achieved equity in a field that
had been notorious for its absence. . . . Truly it could be said, to
borrow a phrase used by Justice Cardozo in another connection,
that a “high-minded Government renounced an advantage that
was felt to be ignoble, and set up a new standard of equity
and conscience.” 173

The 1966 legislation dramatically advanced the cause of fairness
and economic rationality in federal tax collection, but it did not resolve all problems. 174 Incremental changes continued, and continue,
to be made to the governing Code provisions. A brief survey of the
safeguards as they currently stand follows. 175
Relief from tax liens: Upon request by the taxpayer or another affected person, the IRS may release the tax lien, subordinate it to other interests in or claims upon the property, discharge particular
property from the lien, or certify that the lien does not attach to
particular property.176 The IRS also may withdraw a filed notice of
tax lien. 177
170. Id.
171. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 236, 78 Stat. 19, 127.
172. Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, §§ 101, 103, 104, 107-202, 80
Stat. 1125, 1125-49, reprinted at 1966-2 C.B. 623, 623-43.
173. Plumb, supra note 167, at 232-33 (quoting George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose,
289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933)).
174. See id. at 297-98; William T. Plumb, Jr., Federal Liens and Priorities—Agenda for
the Next Decade II, 77 YALE L.J. 605, 605 (1968); William T. Plumb, Jr., Federal Liens and
Priorities—Agenda for the Next Decade III, 77 YALE L.J. 1104, 1188-89 (1968); William T.
Plumb, Jr., The Tax Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws—Tax
Procedures, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1360, 1379-80 (1975).
175. For a more complete description, see RICHARDSON, BORISON & JOHNSON, supra
note 9, at 364-75.
176. I.R.C. § 6325.
177. Id. § 6323(j).
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Relief from levies: Under a variety of conditions—some mandatory
and some within the discretion of the IRS—the IRS may release
a levy and notice of levy and may return property that has been
levied on. 178
Other administrative relief: Taxpayers may secure review of collection controversies by the IRS Appeals Office through the Collection Due Process procedures 179 (with the possibility of subsequent judicial review) and through the Collection Appeals Program 180 (without the possibility of subsequent judicial review). In addition,
the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate is empowered to issue Taxpayer Assistance Orders when the IRS fails to follow established
collection procedures.181
Judicial remedies: Under § 7426, third parties and, in some cases,
taxpayers may sue in federal district court for four kinds of relief: (1)
determination that a levy is wrongful; (2) return of amounts received
from sale of property in excess of tax liability; (3) obtaining funds
held as substituted proceeds; and (4) determination of the IRS’s interest as to substituted proceeds. 182 Taxpayers and third parties may
bring damages actions for improper collection actions by the IRS.183
In addition, a variety of ancillary judicial remedies are provided under statutes outside the Code. 184
7. Shapiro, Laing, and Jeopardy Assessment Review
As seen in Part II.B.3 above, our system is committed to providing
a prepayment mechanism for resolving disputes involving liability for
income tax and some other kinds of taxes. But there is an obvious
peril. In the years that can pass during audit, administrative appeal,
and Tax Court litigation, the ability of the IRS to collect on the eventual judgment can be put at hazard. Taxpayers may secret themselves or their assets, may transfer their assets, or may become insolvent. The government’s legitimate revenue interests must be protected against such eventualities.

178. Id. § 6343.
179. Id. §§ 6320, 6330. These procedures are discussed further in Part IV infra.
180. See I.R.C. § 7123(a).
181. Id. § 7811.
182. Id. § 7426(a).
183. Id. §§ 7426(h), 7432-7433. For discussion of whether existing damages remedies
should be expanded, see Steve Johnson, A Residual Damages Right Against the IRS: A
Cure Worse than the Disease, 88 TAX NOTES 395 (2000); Leandra Lederman, Of Taxpayer
Rights, Wrongs, and a Proposed Remedy, 87 TAX NOTES 1133 (2000); Leandra Lederman,
Taxpayer Rights in the Lurch: A Response to Professor Johnson, 88 TAX NOTES 1041 (2000).
184. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a) (2006) (authorizing quiet title, foreclosure, partition,
condemnation, and interpleader actions).
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Thus, the IRS has the power to make jeopardy and termination
assessments and levies, shortcutting normal assessment and collection procedures in conditions of peril to the revenue.185 But the very
power of those devices inspires concern about possible abuse. The
right to adequate notice and opportunity to be heard as to governmental deprivation of property “is central to the Constitution’s command of due process.” 186 Normally, this is prior notice and opportunity to be heard. “The purpose of this requirement is not only to ensure
abstract fair play to the individual. Its purpose, more particularly, is
to protect his use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment—to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of property . . . .” 187
Post-deprivation notice and hearing are permissible only in “extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at
stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event.” 188
Due process would be traduced were the government to offer no notice and hearing at all, neither pre- nor post-deprivation. 189
In the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court decided two cases involving
the then extant procedures for challenging IRS jeopardy and termination assessments. In Laing190 and Shapiro, 191 the Court expressed
reservations about the constitutional adequacy of those procedures.
Within a few months, Congress enacted § 7429, providing rapid and
reasonably rigorous post-assessment review.192 The section: (1) requires that the IRS inform the taxpayer within five days of the reasons for the expedited assessment or levy; 193 (2) allows the taxpayer
to seek review by the IRS Appeals Office of the expedited action;194 (3)
permits the taxpayer, within ninety days thereafter, to seek district
court or Tax Court review; 195 and (4) requires decision by the court
within twenty days.196 This proceeding does not finally resolve the
185. I.R.C. §§ 6851-6852, 6861-6862.
186. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993).
187. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972).
188. Id. at 82 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971)).
189. “[I]t is very doubtful that the need to collect the revenues is a sufficient reason to
justify seizure causing irreparable injury without a prompt post-seizure inquiry of any kind
into the [IRS’s] basis for [its] claim.” Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 630 n.12
(1976); see also Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 520 (1944).
190. Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161 (1976).
191. Shapiro, 424 U.S. at 629.
192. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1204(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1695 (codified at I.R.C. § 7429).
193. I.R.C. § 7429(a)(1)(B).
194. Id. § 7429(a)(2)-(3).
195. Id. § 7429(b)(1)-(2). Review may be sought in the Tax Court only if the IRS made
the jeopardy assessment after a Tax Court deficiency action had already been commenced.
Id. § 7429(b)(2)(B).
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merits.197 It addresses only whether the making of the expedited assessment and the amount of that assessment were reasonable under
the circumstances. 198 Despite occasional murmurs, § 7429 is generally accepted as constitutionally adequate.
This skein of our tax procedure history shows the delicate interplay of the “fair procedures for taxpayers” value and the “protect the
revenue” value. The former value called into existence prepayment
judicial determinations in the Tax Court as to income taxes and some
other taxes. The latter value required modification, through the jeopardy and termination assessment mechanisms, of the prepayment
procedures to obviate the possibility of abuse. But the former value
again reared its head through § 7429, to modify the modification.
8. TEFRA Partnership Audit/Litigation Procedures
Crises often provoke responses that, although dire in their nature
and consequences, were necessary at the time or at least seemed so to
sober persons lashed by the goad of circumstance. 199 In the 1960s
through 1980s, the proliferation of tax shelters provoked a crisis in
tax administration in the United States. Numerous legislative, regulatory, and judicial responses—of varying degrees of effectiveness
and desirability—were called forth. One of them was the enactment
of the so-called unified partnership audit and litigation procedures by
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (“TEFRA”). 200
Tax shelters were designed, in the main, to generate “paper” losses that could offset real income, thus reducing the participants’ income subject to tax. Because they are “pass-through” entities, part196. Id. § 7429(b)(3).
197. The making of a termination or jeopardy assessment does not obviate the IRS’s
obligation to issue a notice of deficiency triggering the opportunity for Tax Court review of
the merits of the adjustments set out in the notice. In the case of a termination assessment,
the notice for the full terminated tax year must be issued within sixty days after the due
date of the return for the year or the date on which the return was filed. Id. § 6851(b). In
the case of a jeopardy assessment, the notice must be issued within sixty days after the
making of the assessment. Id. § 6861(b).
198. Id. § 7429(g). The reasonableness standard “means something more than ‘not arbitrary and capricious,’ and something less than ‘supported by substantial evidence.’ ” Harvey v. United States, 730 F. Supp. 1097, 1106 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (quoting Loretto v. United
States, 440 F. Supp. 1168, 1172 (E.D. Pa. 1977)).
199. One thinks, for example, of Lincoln’s suspension of some civil liberties during the
Civil War, and of, during World War II, Franklin Roosevelt’s internment of Japanese
Americans, Churchill’s fire-bombing of Dresden, and Truman’s use of the atomic bomb on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
200. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 401-407,
96 Stat. 324, 648-71 (adding I.R.C. §§ 6221-6232). In ensuing years, some of the original
provisions have been modified and complementary sections have been enacted. The most
significant revisions came in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, §§ 12311243, 111 Stat. 788, 1020-30. The current TEFRA and related rules are in I.R.C. §§ 62216255.
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nerships (including, later, limited liability companies taxable as
partnerships) and, to a much lesser extent, S corporations were the
vehicles through which tax shelters were structured and sold.
Before TEFRA, if the IRS doubted the validity of tax benefits
claimed through a partnership, the IRS was compelled to audit the
returns of each partner, making common adjustments to each. However, the sheer volume of tax shelters and “investors” in them produced three serious effects. First, the audit resources of the IRS were
overwhelmed. Untold tens of thousands of returns containing bogus
shelter deductions were allowed to stand because the IRS was unable
to audit the returns within the statute of limitations period for assessment of additional liability.201 Second, the returns the IRS was
able to audit led to a volume of notices of deficiency, and petitions
contesting those notices, that inundated the Tax Court.202 Third, the
frenzy of activity sometimes led to a breach of horizontal equity. The
same substantive items on different returns sometimes were treated
differently by the IRS. 203
A new approach was needed. The IRS wanted to be able to audit
at the entity (partnership) level, rather than having to audit all partners’ returns.204 The IRS sought such authority at least as early as
1978.205 When Congress acted four years later in TEFRA, it did not
create a pure entity system. Instead, Congress created a mixed approach. The IRS audits the partnership return at the partnership
level; the IRS issues any determination of adjustments to a person
designated to represent the partnership; and that person may seek
administrative and judicial review of the adjustments on behalf of
the partnership. However, at each stage, all the substantial partners
have notice and participation rights, preserving the potential for
considerable participation by the individual partners in the audit
and litigation.206

201. Normally three years from the dates on which the returns were filed. I.R.C.
§ 6501(a).
202. For example, between fiscal years 1978 and 1986, largely because of tax shelters,
the number of petitions pending in the Tax Court rose from 23,140 to 83,686. The total rose
each year and often dramatically. The 1979 increase was 16.9%, followed by a 28.9% increase in 1980 and a 31.7% increase in 1981. Harold Dubroff & Charles M. Greene, Recent
Developments in the Business and Procedures of the United States Tax Court, 52 ALB. L.
REV. 33, 35 (1987). Tax shelter petitions were the main drivers of these increases.
203. See, e.g., John B. Palmer III, TEFRA Treats Partnerships as Separate Entities
Under Its New Procedural Rules, 58 J. TAX’N 34, 34 (1983).
204. See Jerome Kurtz, Auditing Partnerships, 134 TAX NOTES 977 (2012).
205. See, e.g., The President’s 1978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 95th Cong., pt. 1, at 280-90 (1978).
206. See I.R.C. §§ 6223-6226. For detailed discussion of the procedures and participation rights, see RICHARDSON, BORISON & JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 161-74.
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Manifold purposes were at work in the creation of the TEFRA
partnership regime. The main inspiration, of course, was protecting
the revenue by providing a more workable method for auditing tax
shelters. 207 This was reinforced by process values, such as enhancement of accurate and consistent decisionmaking. 208
But it would be a mistake to limit the angle of vision to these values. Had they been the whole of Congress’s contemplation, they could
have been achieved—and achieved better—by an unadulterated entity-based approach. Congress chose instead to impose a hybrid system
including substantial notice and participation rights for partners as
an essential part of the bargain.209 Thus, even in this context, Congress cared a lot about providing procedural options that were fair to
taxpayers and perceived by them to be fair.
9. Brockamp and Equitable Tolling
Statutes of limitations serve important functions of promoting finality and minimizing errors caused by stale evidence. But they also
can erode fairness. Reflecting this tension, courts have noted that
“statutes of limitations have numerous statutory and common law
exceptions,” and those exceptions can “profoundly impact[] . . . strict
and literal application[s] of the statute[s].” 210
One of these exceptions is equitable tolling, “a judge-made doctrine ‘which operates independently of the literal wording of the
[statute]’ to suspend or extend a statute of limitations as necessary to
ensure fundamental practicality and fairness.”211 At the federal level,
it is rebuttably presumed that equitable tolling applies,212 and nearly
all U.S. states recognize the doctrine in one form or another.213
Can equitable tolling apply when a taxpayer files a refund claim
after the limitations period has passed? 214 Other than the Ninth Cir207. See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982, at
268 (Comm. Print 1982).
208. See, e.g., A.B.A. Section of Taxation, Proposal as to Audit of Partnerships, 32 TAX
LAW. 551, 551 (1979).
209. For an argument that partner participation should be increased beyond even the
levels provided by TEFRA, see Don R. Spellmann, Taxation Without Notice: Due Process
and Other Notice Shortcomings with the Partnership Audit Rules, 52 TAX LAW. 133 (1998).
210. Province v. Province, 473 S.E.2d 894, 903 (W. Va. 1996).
211. Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 31 Cal. 4th 363, 370 (Cal. 2003) (quoting Addison v.
California, 578 P.2d 941, 943 (1978)).
212. Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990).
213. See Steve R. Johnson, Equitable Tolling in State and Local Tax Cases, 52 ST. TAX
NOTES 917, 917 (2009).
214. In general, taxpayers who believe they have overpaid must file refund claims with
the IRS “within 3 years from the time the return [for the year] was filed or 2 years from the
time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later.” I.R.C. § 6511(a).
THE
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cuit, all federal circuit courts that had considered the matter said
“no.” 215 In Brockamp, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
this conflict.
Brockamp involved two Ninth Circuit cases. In both, the taxpayers
filed their refund claims well after expiration of the limitations period. In both, the taxpayers explained their failure to file timely
as caused by disabilities (senility or alcoholism). In both, the circuit
court accepted that the facts sufficed to trigger application of
equitable tolling.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed both cases, holding
that equitable tolling is not available as to tax refund claims. As a
matter of statutory construction, the Court noted that “[s]ection 6511
sets forth its time limitations in unusually emphatic form . . . in a
highly detailed technical manner [and] reiterates its limitations several times in several different ways.” 216
The Court also expressed concern about the impact of equitable
tolling on orderly tax administration. Noting that the IRS processes
over 200 million returns each year and issues over 90 million refunds, the Court remarked:
To read an “equitable tolling” exception into § 6511 could
create serious administrative problems by forcing the IRS to respond to, and perhaps litigate, large numbers of late claims. . . .
The nature and potential magnitude of the administrative problem
suggest that Congress decided to pay the price of occasional
unfairness in individual cases (penalizing a taxpayer whose claim
is unavoidably delayed) in order to maintain a more workable tax
enforcement system. 217

Soon thereafter, Congress displayed a more liberal spirit. It partly
overthrew Brockamp by enacting a limited tolling provision. The
statute currently provides that the running of the normal § 6511 limitations period “shall be suspended during any period of such individual’s life that such individual is financially disabled.” 218 In general, one is financially disabled if he “is unable to manage his financial affairs by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment . . . which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months.” 219
215. The conflicting cases are cited in United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 348-49
(1997).
216. Id. at 350-51.
217. Id. at 352-53; see also id. at 352 (“Tax law, after all, is not normally characterized
by case-specific exceptions reflecting individualized equities.”).
218. I.R.C. § 6511(h)(1).
219. Id. § 6511(h)(2)(A).
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This is a narrow statutory exception and has been read narrowly
by the courts. 220 Cases which fall outside the narrow statutory exception are controlled by Brockamp’s “no equitable tolling” rule.221
10. IRS Restructuring and Reform Act
The Internal Revenue Service Reform and Restructuring Act of
1998 (“RRA”) 222 is a particularly unlovely experience in the sausage
factory. It is a story about an opportunistic Republican Senator, a
spineless Democratic President, and a complicit media. Senator William Roth was in a tough reelection campaign. He decided to use his
chairmanship of the Senate Finance Committee to generate favorable
publicity and manufacture a campaign issue. The result was multiday hearings at which disaffected taxpayers, seemingly corroborated
by disgruntled IRS employees (testifying, for dramatic effect, from
behind screens to shield them from their employer’s possible retribution), testified as to IRS behavior appearing to range from callous
indifference to jack-booted thuggery. President Clinton, employing
his well-honed triangulation strategy, preferred to jump on the antiIRS bandwagon than to probe the worth of the assertions seriously. The
media, staring at ratings gold, covered the circus enthusiastically.223
The result was a mood inside the Beltway (and even sometimes in
more sober minds outside the Beltway 224) of “IRS bad; must punish
bad IRS.” The result was the RRA, omnibus legislation containing
numerous measures to rein in (actually or symbolically) IRS abuses. 225 The RRA “introduced seventy-one new taxpayer rights and re220. For a proposal to reform the tolling provisions, see T. Keith Fogg & Rachel E.
Zuraw, Financial Disability for All (Villanova Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 2013-3009, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2182772.
221. See, e.g., Haas v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 1, 7-8 (2012).
222. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105206, 112 Stat. 685 (codified in various sections of the I.R.C.).
223. The story is told in greater detail in Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic
Legislation: Perceptions and Realities of the New Burden-of-Proof Rules, 84 IOWA L. REV.
413, 446-57 (1999). See also Bryan T. Camp, Theory and Practice in Tax Administration, 29
VA. TAX REV. 227, 270 (2009) (“Congress became very concerned—one might say hysterical— . . . [and] worked itself into a lather, and mostly over the wrong problem.”).
224. A striking illustration occurred in our criminal tax jurisprudence. I.R.C. § 7212
criminalizes forcible or corrupt interference with tax administration. In a 1998 decision
clearly influenced by the Senate Finance Committee hearings, the Sixth Circuit gave
§ 7212 a cramped reading. United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 958 (6th Cir. 1998) (“In
this day, when Congress is attempting to curb the reach of the IRS into the homes of taxpayers, we cannot construe a penal law such as § 7212(a) to permit such an invasion into
the activities of lawabiding citizens.”). A year later, the Sixth Circuit realized that the outrage of the moment had led it astray, and it limited Kassouf to its facts. United States v.
Bowman, 173 F.3d 595, 600 (6th Cir. 1999).
225. For a description of the changes wrought by the RRA, see Robert Manning & David F. Windish, The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act: An Explanation, 80 TAX NOTES 83
(1998).
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quired, [as of 2003], 1,900 implementation actions by the IRS.”226
Some of these measures were in fact constructive. 227 Others were
partly good and partly bad. 228 Some were largely meaningless.229
Some were inimical to effective tax administration. 230
Subsequent investigations (which received far less publicity than
the original allegations) were unable to confirm the veracity of the
sensational testimony.231 But, in politics, perception often matters
more than facts. 232 Thus, the point that matters for purposes of this
agenda for reform is the value set that the RRA exercise revealed.
Central to the thinking of Congress was “increas[ing] perceptions
of procedural fairness by allowing taxpayers additional procedural
rights and opportunities to tell their side of the story.” 233 This orientation was evident in the hearings described above and was confirmed by the legislative history. The Senate report, explaining reasons for change, was studded with remarks such as the following:
“[A] key reason for taxpayer frustration with the IRS is the lack of
appropriate attention to taxpayer needs.” 234 “The Committee is con226. Nina E. Olson, Taxpayer Rights, Customer Service, and Compliance: A ThreeLegged Stool, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1239, 1243 (2003). For description of the principal changes, see Manning & Windish, supra note 225.
227. For example, imposing an initial burden-of-production on the IRS when it asserts
penalties, see Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. Law.
No. 105-206, § 3001, 112 Stat. 685, 726 (codified at I.R.C. § 7491(c)), and strengthening the
office of the National Taxpayer Advocate, see § 1102, 112 Stat. at 697 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 7803(c)).
228. Such as the Collection Due Process rules discussed infra Part IV.B. See § 3401,
112 Stat. at 746 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 6320, 6330).
229. Examples are the creation of the IRS Oversight Board, see § 1101, 112 Stat. at 691
(codified at I.R.C. § 7802), which has been generally insignificant in operation, and directing the IRS to revise its Mission Statement to put greater emphasis on serving the public
and meeting taxpayers’ needs, see § 1002, 112 Stat. at 690. Priorities in the IRS swing between taxpayer service and enforcement (with the pendulum now more on the enforcement
side), without close correlation to the current wording of the Mission Statement.
230. One example is the deceptive burden-of-proof shift provision, see § 3001, 112 Stat.
at 726 (codified at I.R.C. § 7491(a)). The provision has induced taxpayers to argue the point
in numerous cases, expending resources for all parties and the courts, but has almost never
made a difference in how cases actually are decided. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 223, at
427-46; see also Leandra Lederman, Does the Burden of Proof Matter?, 23 A.B.A. SEC. TAX’N
NEWS Q. 10 (2004); Leandra Lederman, Unforeseen Consequences of the Burden of Proof
Shift, 80 TAX NOTES 379 (1998).
Similarly, the mandatory termination provisions, §§ 1201-1205, 112 Stat. at 71123 (not codified in the Code), had immediate and substantial negative effect on the morale
and productivity of IRS employees.
231. See, e.g., Susan Meador Tobias, Letter to the Editor, IRS Abuse Debate Should Be
a Two-Way Street, 79 TAX NOTES 1071 (1998); Stephen Barr, Report Labels IRS Testimony
“Unfounded,” WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 1998, at A2.
232. Karma also matters. Despite the publicity generated by his hearings, Senator
Roth lost his reelection bid.
233. Leandra Lederman & Stephen W. Mazza, Addressing Imperfections in the Tax
System: Procedural or Substantive Reform?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1423, 1441 (2005).
234. S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 8 (2d Sess. 1998).

2013]

REFORMING FEDERAL TAX LITIGATION

237

cerned that individual and small business taxpayers frequently are at
a disadvantage when forced to litigate with the [IRS].” 235 Furthermore,
[T]axpayers are entitled to protections in dealing with the IRS that
are similar to those they would have in dealing with any other
creditor. Accordingly, the Committee believes that the IRS should
afford taxpayers adequate notice of collection activity and a meaningful hearing before the IRS deprives them of their property. 236

11. Ballard and Tax Court Process
Ballard started out as a prosaic case 237 but ended as anything but.
The IRS alleged that the taxpayers engaged in a scheme involving
kickbacks that they failed to report on their federal income tax returns. 238 The taxpayers filed Tax Court petitions challenging the
IRS’s determinations. The chief judge of the Tax Court assigned the
cases for hearing to a special trial judge. 239 The trial lasted almost
five weeks, producing a transcript exceeding 5400 pages and thousands of exhibits with hundreds of thousands of pages. The briefs
reached nearly 4700 pages.
The special trial judge eventually submitted a report on the consolidated cases to the chief judge as required by former Tax Court
Rule 183(b).240 The chief judge assigned the cases, under the same
rule, to a regular judge, who issued a decision on behalf of the court.
The decision stated: “The Court agrees with and adopts the opinion of
the Special Trial Judge, which is set forth below.” 241 The decision
substantially upheld the IRS’s determinations.
The taxpayers came to believe that the document entitled the
“Opinion of the Special Trial Judge” was not, in fact, that judge’s
work but that the original special trial judge’s report had been substantially modified by the regular judge or by a process of consultation between the special trial judge and the regular judge. The taxpayers filed motions with the Tax Court seeking access to the original

235. Id. at 44.
236. Id. at 67.
237. If a marathon case involving multiple fairly high-profile taxpayers, large deficiencies, and fraud penalties can so be described. The principal taxpayers were Burton Kanter,
a prominent tax attorney, and Claude Ballard and Robert Lisle, both vice presidents of
Prudential Life Insurance Company.
238. Ballard v. Commissioner, 321 F.3d 1037, 1038 (11th Cir. 2003).
239. The Tax Court’s nineteen regular judges are appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate. I.R.C. § 7443. The chief judge of the Tax Court appoints
special trial judges and may designate cases assigned to them. Id. § 7443A.
240. Ballard, 321 F.3d at 1038.
241. Investment Research Assocs., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 951, 963
(1999).
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report or, at least, permission to place that report under seal in the
record on appeal. The Tax Court denied the motions.
The taxpayers appealed to the circuit courts within whose jurisdictions they resided. 242 All three appellate courts accepted the IRS’s
argument that the appearance of the special trial judge’s signature
on the Tax Court’s decision meant that the decision was the special
trial judge’s report, and so rejected the taxpayers’ objection to the absence from the record of the original report.243
On the merits, the Seventh Circuit (over a dissent) and the Eleventh Circuit largely affirmed. The Fifth Circuit largely upheld the
asserted deficiencies but reversed as to the fraud penalty.
The Fifth Circuit taxpayer did not seek Supreme Court review.
The Court granted certiorari as to the Seventh and Eleventh Circuit
cases. The Court reversed as to the exclusion of the original report
from the record.244 Justice Ginsburg wrote for the majority.245 Justice
Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred. 246 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented.247
The majority held that the Tax Court had failed to follow its own
rule. That rule, the Court held, contemplated an initial report by the
special trial judge, the fact-finding of which the assigned regular
judge owed deference. 248 Over time, however, the Tax Court’s practice
under the rule had morphed into the regular judge treating “the
special trial judge’s report essentially as an in-house draft to
be worked over collaboratively by the regular judge and the special
trial judge.” 249
Resolving the case on this ground, the majority found it unnecessary to address the taxpayers’ arguments that the Due Process
Clause 250 and the applicable appellate review statute 251 compelled
inclusion of the original report in the record on appeal. The majority’s
choice of rationale may have reflected Justice Ginsburg’s well-known

242. See I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1)(A).
243. Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner, 341 F.3d 364, 384 (5th Cir. 2003); Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner, 337 F.3d 833, 840-41 (7th Cir. 2003); Ballard, 321 F.3d at 1042.
244. Ballard v. Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40 (2005).
245. Id. at 44.
246. Id. at 65.
247. Id. at 68.
248. Id. at 54.
249. Id. at 57.
250. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
251. I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1); see Brief of Amica Curiae Professor Leandra Lederman in
Support of Petitioners at 2-3, Ballard v. Commissioner, 554 U.S. 40 (2005) (Nos. 03-184 &
03-1034).
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preference to resolve cases on the narrowest available ground, or it
may have seemed the best way of letting the Tax Court down easily.252
Despite the majority’s stated rationale, other commentators 253 and
I see Ballard as driven by the desire to provide fairness in judicial
remedies, rather than by a technical construction of the language and
history of a rule. Three facts point in this direction. First, it is striking that the Court granted certiorari in this case in the first place.
There was no circuit conflict; the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits were in agreement as to the procedural issue. “It is likely that
the Supreme Court granted certiorari out of a concern that the lack
of transparency denied meaningful appellate review.” 254
Second, the majority picked its rationale in disregard of its accustomed practice. The rule construction argument was not made in the
taxpayers’ circuit court briefs, in their certiorari petitions, or in their
questions presented. The Court typically does not consider such arguments. 255 Something was going on beneath the surface.
Third, although seemingly an exercise in rule construction, the
majority opinion is peppered with words and phrases like “transparent,” 256 “undisclosed,” 257 “impedes fully informed appellate review,”258
and “concealment.” 259 Here the subtext is more revealing than the text.
The Court remanded the cases, unfortunately without clear instructions. 260 The course on remand was not smooth. The three in252. Telling a court that it is violating due process is a serious move. On the other
hand, it may be an even greater affront to tell a court that it doesn’t understand what its
own rule says. One of the arguments made by the dissent was that the Tax Court’s interpretation of its own rule was due substantial deference by analogy to Bowles v. Seminole
Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). See Ballard, 544 U.S. at 70 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). The majority grudgingly conceded that “the Tax Court is not without leeway in
interpreting its own Rules,” id. at 59, but found deference inappropriate because the Tax
Court’s construction of the rule at issue was “arbitrary,” id. at 61. For discussion of this
principle, see Steve R. Johnson, Auer/Seminole Rock Deference in the Tax Court, 11 PITT.
TAX REV. (forthcoming 2013).
253. See, e.g., Katherine Kmiec Turner, No More Secrets: Under Ballard v. Commissioner, Special Trial Judge Reports Must Be Revealed, 26 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES
247, 294 (2006) (“From the public’s perspective, Ballard ensures less secrecy and a fair
trial.”).
254. Robin L. Greenhouse & Joshua D. Odintz, The Status of Tax Court Special Trial
Judge Reports After Ballard: Where Do We Go From Here?, 102 J. TAX’N 352, 355 (2005).
255. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 n.2
(1989). This prompted Chief Justice Rehnquist to remark in his Ballard dissent: “Only by
failing to abide by our own Rules can the Court hold that the Tax Court failed to follow its
Rules.” 544 U.S. at 68 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
256. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 55 (majority opinion).
257. Id. at 57.
258. Id. at 59-60.
259. Id. at 62 n.15.
260. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence attempted to make good the deficiency of the majority’s opinion. Id. at 65-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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volved circuit courts remanded the cases to the Tax Court with instructions to review the matter in accordance with the Supreme
Court’s opinion and to give due regard to the determinations in the
special trial judge’s original report.261 The Tax Court rendered a decision which adhered in significant part to its prior view, that is, that the
taxpayers were liable for large deficiencies and for fraud penalties.262
Again, the taxpayers appealed. The circuit courts were not pleased
with the Tax Court’s work. Each concluded that the Tax Court again
failed to give due deference to the special trial judge’s determinations. They again remanded, this time with instructions that the Tax
Court adopt as its decision the special trial judge’s original decision
holding for the taxpayers. 263
12. Administrative Law in Tax
Authority in tax is a three-legged stool, consisting of statutes, case
law, and administrative guidance. The last leg includes Treasury
regulations, which have force-of-law status if they reasonably implement the statute,264 and a variety of lesser guidance documents,265
which typically are not binding but may have persuasive influence.266
Given the importance of administrative guidance, administrative
law would seem to be important in tax. It is, but the tax community
has recognized this only slowly and grudgingly. 267 For most of our tax
history, courts reviewing challenges to tax regulations or practices
steered clear of general administrative law, developing instead a taxspecific jurisprudence emphasizing reasonableness in general and a
number of hallmarks of reliability in particular. 268
261. Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner, 431 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2005); Ballard v. Commissioner, 429 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 2005); Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner, 406 F.3d 933
(7th Cir. 2005).
262. Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 721 (2007).
263. Kanter v. Commissioner, 590 F.3d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 2009); Estate of Lisle v.
Commissioner, 541 F.3d 595, 597 (5th Cir. 2008); Ballard v. Commissioner, 522 F.3d 1229,
1255 (11th Cir. 2008).
264. See, e.g., Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 115 (1939); Boulez
v. Commissioner, 810 F.2d 209, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987).
265. For description of many types of such documents, see RICHARDSON, BORISON &
JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 17-25.
266. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No Man’s Land of Tax Code
Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 239.
267. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, “Civil”izing Tax Procedure: Applying General Federal Learning to Statutory Notices of Deficiency, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 183, 183 (1996). This
phenomenon has been called—and described as—“tax exceptionalism.” See Kristin E.
Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1537 (2006).
268. See, e.g., Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979)
(identifying six factors); Laurens Williams, The Preparation and Promulgation of Treasury
Department Regulations Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, TAX EXEC., Jan. 1956, at

2013]

REFORMING FEDERAL TAX LITIGATION

241

To regularize administrative practice among the numerous federal
agencies, Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”) in 1946. Treasury and the IRS are “agencies” as defined by
the APA 269 and so are subject to its requirements. Nonetheless, for
decades, both the APA 270 and general principles of administrative
law 271 appeared only rarely in tax decisions.
The frequency of appearance of administrative law doctrines in
tax has increased markedly in the last fifteen years, in part because
of the RRA. Some of the areas at issue involved rights created or expanded by the RRA, such as the CDP rules 272 and spousal relief.273
The greatest recent prominence of administrative law in tax, however, has been in two areas: the procedural validity of Treasury regulations and deference doctrine. Both are discussed below.
For generations, tax regulations promulgated by the Treasury
have been attacked by taxpayers discomfited by them. The standard
attacks have been substantive in nature: that the regulation in question was inconsistent with the text, structure, or purpose of the relevant statute or with important extrinsic norms. 274
In recent years, however, taxpayers have added procedural arrows
to their quivers.275 The use of these weapons is still in relative infancy. Here are examples of that use. First, subject to certain exceptions,
the APA prescribes that in order for it to promulgate binding rules,
an agency must first publish notice of its proposed rulemaking and
give interested persons opportunity to submit comments. 276 Treasury,
3, 9-11 (1956).
269. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012).
270. See, e.g., Wing v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 17, 28-29 (1983); Wendland v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 355 (1982).
271. One area in which the analogy to general administrative law was made involved
whether the IRS has a judicially enforceable duty to treat similarly situated taxpayers
similarly. See Steve R. Johnson, An IRS Duty of Consistency: The Failure of Common Law
Making and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 77 TENN. L. REV. 563 (2010) (reviewing the
cases and commentary); Lawrence Zelenak, Should Courts Require the Internal Revenue
Service to be Consistent?, 38 TAX L. REV. 411 (1985).
272. See, e.g., Robinette v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 85 (2004), rev’d, 439 F.3d 455 (8th
Cir. 2006); Kitchen Cabinets, Inc. v. United States, 87 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1393 (N.D. Tex.
2001); Mesa Oil, Inc. v. United States, 86 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 7312 (D. Colo. 2000); see also
Danshera Cords, Administrative Law and Judicial Review of Tax Collection Decisions, 52
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 429, 440 (2008); Diane L. Fahey, Is the United States Tax Court Exempt
from Administrative Law Jurisprudence when Acting as a Reviewing Court?, 58 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 603, 609 (2010).
273. See, e.g., Wilson v. Commissioner, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1552 (2010), aff’d, 705 F.3d
980 (9th Cir. 2013).
274. See Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era,
32 VA. TAX REV. 269 (2012).
275. See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, Intermountain and the Importance of Administrative
Law in Tax Law, 128 TAX NOTES 837 (2010).
276. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), (d) (2012).
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however, may not always honor these requirements in promulgating
tax regulations.277 This argument has been presented in a number of
recent high-profile tax cases.278
Second, under the APA, courts are empowered to strike down
agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.” 279 Under current doctrine, an
agency’s rule can be arbitrary for a number of reasons, including that
the agency relied on factors Congress did not want it to consider, the
agency failed to take some important factor into account, or the agency gave an unjustifiable or implausible explanation for its action. 280
Among these, the “inadequate explanation” strand has received
considerable attention recently. Cases 281 and commentary 282 are applying this strand to tax regulations with increasing frequency.
Third, in general, “retroactive [tax] regulations are prohibited, except under limited circumstances.” 283 The meaning of retroactivity
and the permitted exceptions to the prohibition of it potentially are at
issue in a number of tax controversies. Retroactivity questions were
raised, but avoided by the Supreme Court, in the recent Home Concrete decision.284 Inevitably, retroactivity issues will have to be
squarely addressed in future tax cases.
Deference doctrine entails the extent to which courts, as they
interpret statutes, must or should accede to the views of the statutes’
meanings espoused by the agencies charged with implementing
the statutes. Deference issues go back generations, but their promi-

277. See Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of)
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1153 (2008); Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s
(Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727 (2007).
278. See, e.g., Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 211, 220-23 (2010), rev’d, 650 F.3d
691 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2120 (2012).
279. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
280. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
281. See, e.g., Dominion Resources, Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir.
2012); Mannella v. Commissioner, 631 F.3d 115, 127 (3d Cir. 2011) (Ambro, J., dissenting);
Fla. Bankers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 2014-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,133 (D.D.C.
2014); Carpenter Family Invs., LLC v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 373, 395-96 (2011).
282. See, e.g., Patrick J. Smith, The APA’s Reasoned-Explanation Rule and IRS Deficiency Notices, 134 TAX NOTES 331 (2012).
283. Marriott Int’l Resorts, L.P. v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 291, 303 (2008), aff’d, 586
F.3d 962 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see I.R.C. § 7805(b), (e).
284. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012). Compare
Brief for the United States at 12, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012) (No. 11-139), with Brief for Respondents at 45-48, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012) (No. 11-139).
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nence has grown exponentially since the Supreme Court’s 1984
Chevron decision. 285
The extent to which Chevron or other doctrines of deference
should operate in tax was controversial for decades, but now is moving towards greater clarity. In its 2011 Mayo decision, the Supreme
Court held that, in general, Chevron provides the applicable standard
when a tax regulation is challenged on substantive grounds, regardless of whether the regulation was promulgated under the general
authority of I.R.C. § 7805(a) or specific authority set out in more particular sections of the Code. 286 Numerous details remain to be filled in
as to both regulations and sub-regulation tax guidance documents,
but Mayo sets the general frame for future discussions. 287
Thus, the profile of administrative law in tax has been raised
dramatically and, I believe, irreversibly. What values does this trend
further? The APA was a balance of “green light” and “red light” features. In some respects, the goal was to facilitate agency actions
while, in other respects, the idea was to prevent agencies from trampling on citizens’ rights. 288
More specifically, the APA’s notice-and-comment rules are designed to improve the accuracy with which regulations implement
congressional intent, to minimize unnecessary regulatory burdens, to
provide interested parties meaningful participation in the rulemaking process, and to raise citizen confidence in government.289
Deference doctrine is designed to improve accuracy through bringing
to bear agency expertise while preserving the role of the courts to
keep agencies within their legitimate domains. 290 The increased
prominence of administrative law in tax honors these objectives.291

285. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron is the most frequently cited case in American law. See STEPHEN G. BREYER, RICHARD B.
STEWART, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MATTHEW L. SPITZER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 289 (5th ed. 2002).
286. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 714
(2011); see also Halbig v. Sebelius, 2014-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,138 (D.D.C. 2014).
287. For evaluation of the significance of Mayo and appraisal of post-Mayo issues, see
Johnson, supra note 274; Steve R. Johnson, Mayo and the Future of Tax Regulations, 130
TAX NOTES 1547 (2011); Leandra Lederman & Stephen W. Mazza, More Mayo Please?
Temporary Regulations After Mayo Foundation v. United States, 31 A.B.A. SEC. TAX’N
NEWS Q. 15 (2011); David J. Shakow, Who’s Afraid of the APA?, 134 TAX NOTES 825 (2012).
288. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS: CASES AND MATERIALS 19-24 (2d ed. 2006).
289. See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
290. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864-65.
291. See, e.g., Leslie Book, A New Paradigm for IRS Guidance: Ensuring Input and
Enhancing Participation, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 517 (2012); Rimma Tsvasman, Note, No More
Excuses: A Case for the IRS’s Full Compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 76
BROOK. L. REV. 837 (2011).
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C. Criteria
What do we learn from the above key events? Important affairs
over time rarely reveal the hand of only a single cause or influence.
So it is here. Multiple purposes are evident in the legislative, regulatory, and judicial developments shaping tax procedure.
The history shows four sets of values at work: (1) providing remedies for taxpayers and third parties that are both meaningful and
perceived to be fair; (2) protecting revenue collection from unreasonable interference; (3) achieving decisional accuracy; and (4) promoting process efficiency, reducing costs and delays.
Professor, later Judge, Sneed developed a number of criteria driving federal income tax policy generally. As is the approach in this Article, Sneed developed his topoi from distillation of our national experience rather than from his own values preferences. In his view, “the
legislative, administrative, and judicial history of the federal income
tax, as well as the pertinent literature, reveals the existence of seven
pervasive purposes which have shaped its rates and structure.”292
Sneed identified these seven purposes thusly:
(1) to supply adequate revenue, (2) to achieve a practical and
workable income tax system, (3) to impose equal taxes upon those
who enjoy equal incomes, (4) to assist in achieving economic stability, (5) to reduce economic inequality, (6) to avoid impairment of
the operation of the market-oriented economy and (7) to accomplish
a high degree of harmony between the income tax and the soughtfor political order. 293

Of these, the first, second, and seventh purposes bear with particular
force on federal tax procedure.
Taken as a whole, the value most strongly evident in the key
events is providing remedies: mechanisms by which taxpayers and
affected third parties may challenge IRS liability determinations and
collection actions, mechanisms that are both efficacious and perceived to be fair. Henceforth, this Article will sometimes describe this
as the Primary Value. The remaining desiderata will sometimes be
called Second-Order Values.
The Primary Value, then, will be the first criterion against which
to measure the desirability of current features of the federal tax litigation system and of proposed changes to it. But, in practical affairs,
single values rarely are absolute. At some point, the accumulation

292. Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567,
568 (1965).
293. Id. (emphasis in original).
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of powerful contrary consequences can overwhelm even highly
cherished values. 294
Thus, there are two circumstances in which our evaluation of features and proposed changes will turn on Second-Order Values. First,
there are some situations in which the Primary Value is not reasonably at stake. Second-Order Values will be decisive when the adequacy
of remedies would not be either meaningfully advanced or meaningfully threatened by the current feature or the proposed change. Furthermore, there may be instances in which a trickle of remedies is
outweighed by a torrent of revenue protection, decisional accuracy, or
efficiency. In cases of stark disproportion, large Second-Order effects
should be permitted to defeat small Primary effects.
The following parts of this Article will apply the above criteria in
several areas. Left to my own devices, I would weigh the criteria
somewhat differently. Specifically, process efficiency shines brighter
in my own constellation of values.295 For example, I am more inclined
than Congress has been to say that taxpayers must live with the consequences of their choices, even if the consequences include losing
opportunities to litigate.296
Efficiency also often has a preferred place for me relative to decisional accuracy. I share Justice Brandeis’ conviction that often it is
more important that a question of “law be settled than that it be settled right.” 297 In addition, Congress has shown the ready ability to
reverse tax decisions—both of the Supreme Court 298 and lower
294. For example, the Roman declaration “fiat justicia ruat coelem” (let justice be done
even if the sky falls) is stirring but not a practical reality. No matter how much we aspire
to do justice, every legal system makes decisions that subordinate the pursuit of justice to
other values in some circumstances.
295. For example, I was among the few defenders of the Tax Court’s practice that the
Supreme Court invalidated in Ballard v. Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40 (2005), discussed in
Part II.B.11 supra. See Steve R. Johnson, Further Thoughts on Kanter and Ballard, 105
TAX NOTES 1235 (2004) (arguing that protection of the Tax Court’s decisional process was
more important than doubtful gains to fairness or decisional accuracy).
296. For example, as discussed in Part II.B supra, in responding to the IRS’s plea for
procedural help in auditing tax shelter partnerships, Congress in 1982 created entity-level
audit combined with partner participation. As argued below, this hybridization has been
the cause of great complication and confusion. To me, it would have been reasonable to
dispense with partner participation, on the ground that the partners’ choice to conduct
business in entity form should remit them to only entity-level procedures.
297. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis seemingly was paraphrasing—but with some difference in emphasis—
Justice Swayne’s observation generations earlier in Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3
Wall.) 713, 724 (1865) (“It is almost as important that the law should be settled . . . as that
it should be settled correctly.”). I am indebted to my colleague Adam Hirsch for bringing
Gilman to my attention.
298. See, e.g., Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 531 U.S. 206 (2001), superseded by statute,
I.R.C. § 108(d)(7)(A). This Article has identified several Supreme Court decisions later
overturned by Congress. See United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347 (1997) (see supra
notes 210-17 and accompanying text); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845) (see su-
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courts 299—with which it disagrees. Courts should, of course, strive
assiduously to reach results that correctly apply the provisions of the
Code, but the possibility of legislative correction buffers the consequences in those instances in which such efforts come up short. Thus,
my own criteria would accord efficiency concerns higher priority.
I acknowledge the possibility that my personal values preferences
may compromise the dispassion I hope to apply in reading the historical record. This is an ever present peril.300 Some
scholars suggest that facts about the past are without meaning until they are woven into a story by the historian. Thus, in choosing
which facts to emphasize and how to interpret them, the historian
will often make choices based upon factors extrinsic to pure research. Although history is continuously refined through testing
hypotheses against the facts, the story it tells will be decisively influenced by the “meta-theories,” the overarching views of the
world, held by the historian. 301

However, the exercise in this Article is to apply faithfully to procedural choices the values that emerge from the system as it has developed, not the system as I might wish it had developed. 302
III. REFORMS AS TO AVAILABLE COURTS
Based on the criteria developed in Part II, I advance three suggestions as to the courts that should be available as fora in which to litigate federal tax controversies. First, the Tax Court should be given
pra notes 49-58 and accompanying text); Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137 (1836)
(see supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text).
299. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Ewing, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006), superseded by
statute, I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(A); Commissioner v. United States & Int’l Sec. Corp., 130 F.2d
894 (3rd Cir. 1942), superseded by statute, Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 116,
56 Stat. 798, 812; Cole v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1935), superseded by statute,
Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-552, §51(b), 52 Stat. 447, 476; Container Corp. v.
Commissioner, 134 T.C. 122 (2010), aff’d, 2011 WL 1664358 (5th Cir. May 2, 2011), superseded by statute, I.R.C. § 861(a)(9).
300. As it is, for example, when judges apply legislative history. “It sometimes seems
that citing legislative history is still, as my late colleague Harold Leventhal once observed,
akin to ‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.’ ” Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L.
REV. 195, 214 (1983).
301. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479, 1510 (1987) (citing William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237, 1240-45 (1986); G. Edward White, The Text, Interpretation,
and Critical Standards, 60 TEX. L. REV. 569, 569 (1982)).
302. Fitzerald described Omar Khayyam as “preferring rather to soothe the Soul . . .
into Acquiescence with Things as he saw them, than to perplex it with vain disquietude
after what they might be.” OMAR KHAYYÁM, THE RUBÁIYÁT OF OMAR KHAYYÁM 18 (Edward
Fitzgerald trans., Three Sirens Press 1st ed. n.d.) (emphasis in original). That was an inaccurate description of the great Tent Maker. It is a fair description of the approach of this
Article.
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quasi-plenary, but nonexclusive, civil tax jurisdiction. Second, calls to
create a national court of tax appeals should continue to be rejected.
Third, the Court of Federal Claims should be divested of jurisdiction
to hear tax cases. These suggestions are developed below.
A. Tax Court Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the ancestors of the Tax Court initially was
limited to deficiency actions, but the Tax Court’s jurisdiction has expanded—piecemeal, but substantially—in ensuing decades. Nonetheless, holes remain in this patchwork quilt.
Almost all these holes should be filled. I propose that Congress
grant the Tax Court nearly plenary jurisdiction over civil tax controversies. Discussed below are: (1) expansions of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction beyond deficiency actions; (2) areas that remain outside the
Tax Court’s jurisdiction; (3) areas to which that jurisdiction should be
expanded; and (4) limits on such expansion.
1. Historical Growth of Tax Court Jurisdiction
As discussed in Part II.B.3, what is now the United States Tax
Court had its roots as an administrative agency, then morphed into
an Article I court. As an Article I court, it is fundamental that “[t]he
Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and may exercise its
jurisdiction only to the extent authorized by Congress.” 303 The Tax
Court does not have authority to enlarge upon its statutory grants
of jurisdiction.304
Starting from its original deficiency jurisdiction, the Tax Court’s
jurisdiction has grown over the generations. In some instances, the
Tax Court’s new jurisdiction over particular types of actions is exclusive. In other instances, such jurisdiction is concurrent with that of
the district courts or the Court of Federal Claims.
The Tax Court’s expanded jurisdiction includes TEFRA actions,305
Collection Due Process actions, 306 and jeopardy assessment review,307
303. Kasper v. Commissioner, 137 T.C. 37, 40 (2011); see also Cohen v. Commissioner,
139 T.C. 299 (2012); Judge v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1175, 1180-81 (1987); Naftel v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985).
304. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 885, 888 (1989). This
principle has had play in many areas, including whether the Tax Court has authority to
apply equitable doctrines such as equitable recoupment. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Equity and the Article I Court: Is the Tax Court’s Exercise of Equitable Powers Constitutional?,
5 FLA. TAX REV. 357 (2001). It has since been confirmed that the Tax Court has such authority. I.R.C. § 6214(b).
305. I.R.C. §§ 6225(b), 6226(a), 6228(a)(1), 6234(c), 6246(b), 6247(a), 6252(a).
306. Id. § 6330(d); see, e.g., Brian Isaacson & Karen Phu, Jurisdiction in the Tax Court
to Hear Section 6330 Challenges: A Need for Clarification, PRAC. TAX LAW., Spring 2008, at
27; Carlton M. Smith, The Tax Court Keeps Growing Its Collection Due Process Powers, 133
TAX NOTES 859 (2011).
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all of which are discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this Article.
In addition, Congress has granted the Tax Court authority to issue
declaratory judgments in a variety of contexts, including declaratory
judgments as to qualification of certain retirement plans, 308 valuation
of gifts, 309 tax-exempt status of state and local bonds,310 eligibility for
deferred payment of estate tax, 311 and eligibility of organizations for
tax-exempt status. 312
The Tax Court also has received jurisdiction to review a variety of
other actions and determinations by the IRS. These include decisions
as to interest abatement, 313 redetermination of interest assessed on
deficiencies, 314 restraint of premature assessment or collection,315 review of proposed sales of seized property, 316 determination of employment status of workers, 317 determinations of awards for tax whistleblowers,318 review of transferee liability, 319 and IRS decisions not to
grant equitable spousal relief.320
In general, the pace of expansions of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction
has accelerated. After slow growth for generations, such expansions
have been occurring more often since the 1980s, inspired in part by
the Taxpayer Rights movement. 321 The expansions have reflected the
desire of Congress to enhance remedies for taxpayers, further judicial
economy, and enhance procedural flexibility.322

307. I.R.C. § 7429(b)(2); see TAX CT. R. 56.
308. I.R.C. § 7476(a).
309. Id. § 7477(a).
310. Id. § 7478(a).
311. Id. § 7479(a).
312. Id. § 7428(a).
313. Id. § 6404(h)(1).
314. Id. § 7481(c); see TAX CT. R. 261.
315. I.R.C. § 6213(a); see TAX CT. R. 55.
316. I.R.C. § 6863(b); see TAX CT. R. 57.
317. I.R.C. § 7436(a).
318. Id. § 7623(b)(4); see, e.g., Cohen v. Commissioner, 139 T.C. 299, 304 (2012); Kasper
v. Commissioner, 137 T.C. 37, 41 (2011).
319. I.R.C. § 6901(a).
320. Id. § 6015(e)(1)(A).
321. This movement included enactment of several Taxpayer Bills of Rights as well as
pro-taxpayer sections in other measures. See, e.g., Omnibus Taxpayer Bill of Rights, enacted as Tit. VI, Subtit. J of Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-647, 102 Stat. 3342, 3730; Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat.
1452 (1996); Taxpayer Bill of Rights 3, enacted as Tit. III of Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685, 726.
322. See, e.g., F. Brook Voght, Amended Tax Court Rules Reflect New Jurisdiction and
Goal of Increased Efficiency, 73 J. TAX’N 404, 404 (1990).
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2. Areas Where the Tax Court Lacks Jurisdiction
In the pre-assessment context, perhaps the most significant subject over which the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction is refund suits. When
the Tax Court has acquired jurisdiction in a deficiency action, it
might conclude that, not only is there no deficiency for the tax year(s)
at issue, but also that there had been an overpayment for the year(s).
The Tax Court has jurisdiction to determine such overpayment and
to command that it be refunded. 323 The Tax Court does not, however,
have jurisdiction to hear free-standing refund actions.
In the post-assessment context, the Tax Court’s jurisdiction over
collection matters is limited. In the main, it can hear some collection
matters but only if a Collection Due Process case is properly before it.324
In addition, there are several categories of actions that Congress
has authorized to be brought in district court but not in Tax Court.
These include a wide variety of suits by the government in aid of enforcement, 325 taxpayer suits to contest assessable penalties, 326 suits
by taxpayers and others to quash IRS summons or other information
gathering,327 and miscellaneous other taxpayer actions. 328
3. Where to Expand Tax Court Jurisdiction and Where Not
to Expand
The current jurisdiction of the Tax Court resembles a cloak with
many holes of varying sizes. As seen above, the pattern is the product
of history, not rationality. This hit-and-miss arrangement guarantees
the existence of traps for the unwary. Taxpayers regularly discover

323. I.R.C. §§ 6214(a), 6512(b); see TAX CT. R. 260.
324. I.R.C. § 6330.
325. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 7323(a) (action to enforce forfeiture), 7402(a) (miscellaneous actions), 7403(a) (lien enforcement action), 7404 (estate tax enforcement action), 7405(a) (erroneous refund recovery action), 7407(a) (return preparer enforcement action), 7409(a)(1)
(action to enjoin political expenditures), 7611(c)(2)(A)(ii) (government action as to church
tax investigation).
326. E.g., id. §§ 6679(b) (penalty for failure to file foreign returns), 6693(d) (penalty as
to retirement accounts), 6694(c)(2) (preparer penalty), 6696(b) (review of penalties under
§§ 6694, 6695, 6695A), 6698 (penalty for failure to file partnership return), 6699(d) (penalty
for failure to file S corporation return), 6703(b), (c)(2) (penalties under §§ 6700, 6701,
6702), 6706(c) (original-issue-discount information penalty), 6707A(d)(2) (failure to rescind
§ 6707A penalty), 6713(c) (penalty as to disclosure by return preparer).
327. E.g., id. §§ 982(c)(2)(B) (proceeding to quash formal document request),
6038A(e)(4)(C) (proceeding to quash summons as to foreign-owned corporations),
6038C(d)(4) (proceeding to quash summons as to foreign corporation engaged in a U.S.
trade on business), 7609(h)(1) (action to quash third-party summons), 7611(c)(2)(A)(i) (taxpayer action as to church tax investigation).
328. E.g., id. §§ 6402(g) (review of § 6402 reduction), 7426(a) (taxpayer and third party
actions as to collection).
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that they have no Tax Court remedy, despite the fact that the cause
is a core tax matter and is well within the competence of the court.329
The logic behind creation of the Tax Court supports extending the
court’s jurisdiction. As seen in Part II.B.3 above, the Tax Court was
created to bring special expertise to bear and to develop a nationally
uniform body of tax law. Tax Court judges—by virtue of their preappointment backgrounds and their tax-only dockets—are more
technically expert in tax than are the generalist judges of the district
courts, the bankruptcy courts, and the partly-tax/partly-nontax Court
of Federal Claims.
This expertise differential is not confined to deficiency cases. It
extends, in varying degrees, to all tax matters. For example, there is
no reason why the Tax Court should not be able to hear refund suits.
The same substantive issues arise in both deficiency and refund
suits. Some procedural issues are unique to refund cases.330 However,
many Tax Court judges are likely to have handled refund cases before their elevation to the bench, and most district court judges decide tax refund procedural issues quite rarely. The Tax Court already
has refund jurisdiction incident to its deficiency jurisdiction. 331 It
should have independent refund jurisdiction as well.
In addition, the Tax Court should have widespread jurisdiction as
to tax collection controversies. Such controversies often do entail
application of state property and other laws, for example, in the determination of the property interests possessed by the tax delinquent 332 and in assessing the validity and priority of competing
claims of third parties.333
It is sometimes thought that district courts, which deal with state
law more regularly, have an advantage over the Tax Court in this
regard. However, practicing tax lawyers—which are what most Tax
Court judges once were—are often required to work with state property laws. 334 Moreover, Tax Court judges routinely work with state
329. See, e.g., Roberts v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1787 (2012) (holding that
the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to review applications of overpayments made pursuant to
§ 6402); Adrianne Hodgkins, Getting a Second Chance: The Need for Tax Court Jurisdiction
Over IRS Denials of Relief Under Section 66, 65 LA. L. REV. 1167, 1167 (2005) (“[I]f the
taxpayer filed a separate return while living in a community property state, the Tax Court
will not review of denial [sic] [joint-and-several liability] relief under section 66 of the Code
because Congress failed to give the Tax Court jurisdiction over such denials.”).
330. See RICHARDSON, BORISON & JOHNSON, supra note 9, ch. 9.
331. I.R.C. § 6214.
332. See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, After Drye: The Likely Attachment of the Federal Tax
Lien to Tenancy-by-the-Entireties Interests, 75 IND. L.J. 1163, 1174-80 (2000); Steve R.
Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc: Tenancy-by-the-Entireties Interests and the
Federal Tax Lien, 60 MO. L. REV. 839, 855-68 (1995).
333. See supra Part II.B.6.
334. See, e.g., Erwin N. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L.
REV. 1153, 1183-84 (1944).
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property law in estate and gift tax cases, and often in income tax cases as well. Moreover, as noted in the preceding subpart, the expansion of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction over the decades has given it experience with collection issues in many contexts. In particular, the
thousands of Collection Due Process cases that the Tax Court has
heard in the last fifteen years has exposed the court to numerous
collection controversies.
Also, Part V.B below notes the phenomenon of “pure” APA tax
suits. The Tax Court’s expanded jurisdiction should include them.
There would be relatively few such suits, and the Tax Court is being
forced to learn and grapple with administrative law principles even
in cases already within its jurisdiction.335
The expanded Tax Court jurisdiction should be concurrent, not
exclusive. Such other courts as Congress has already designated, or
may in the future designate, able to hear the various categories
of cases should still be able to hear them. This proposal is not
a stealth initiative; a stalking horse for eventually exclusive Tax
Court jurisdiction.
I propose that the Tax Court have nearly plenary, not plenary, tax
jurisdiction. I would reserve three areas. First, criminal tax cases
should remain the exclusive province of the district courts, just as all
criminal cases are. The Tax Court is and should remain a civil tribunal.
Second, I would keep Tax Court cases as taxpayer, not IRS, initiated events. As seen in Part III.A above, there is concern in some
quarters that the Tax Court has a pro-IRS bias. That concern is misplaced, but it does exist. If the IRS were able to go into Tax Court to
secure compulsive orders, 336 the concern would rise. The Primary
Value of providing taxpayer remedies that are both fair and perceived
to be fair could be compromised. To prevent this, the reform would
give the Tax Court jurisdiction over taxpayer-initiated actions only.
Third, judicial review of jeopardy and termination assessments
under § 7429 337 should continue to take place only in the district
courts, not the Tax Court (except to the limited degree currently
permitted). 338 A paramount need—a Primary Value need—in such
review is expedition.339 The district courts sit in ninety-five districts
with divisions in multiple cities within the districts. The Tax Court
sits only in Washington, D.C., except when it periodically sends out
335. See supra Part II.B.12.
336. Such as summons enforcement orders, writs of entry, search warrants, promoter
and preparer injunctions, and other types of writs and orders.
337. See supra Part II.B.7.
338. See I.R.C. § 7429(b)(2)(B).
339. Hence the short time frames for requesting review and for decision by the reviewing court. See id. § 7429(a)(1)(B), (b)(3).
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judges to “ride circuit.” District court can best provide the speedy
resolution required by § 7429 at reasonable cost and convenience
to taxpayers.
B. National Court of Tax Appeals
Discussion of the jurisdiction of the Tax Court—a tax specialist
trial court—invites inquiry as to appellate level tax specialization.
This involves a long-playing controversy.
Proposals often have been made to create a national court of tax
appeals. Not surprisingly, the details of the proposals vary. 340 At the
core, however, the idea is to centralize federal tax appeals—now
heard by thirteen circuit courts—in a single, new tax appellate court.
The decisions of the new court would be final absent Supreme Court
certiorari review, legislative reversal, or regulatory reversal as sanctioned by the Brand X decision.341
This idea is most frequently associated with Dean Griswold,342 but
many others, including an impressive array of luminaries, have associated themselves with the proposal. 343 The eminence of the proponents, however, did not stifle opposition. The proposal has been decried with at least as much vigor as it has been urged. 344 The debate
comes in and goes out like the tide but never is silent for too long. 345

340. The details of some of the early proposals, and of alternatives to them, are described by H. Todd Miller, Comment, A Court of Tax Appeals Revisited, 85 YALE L.J. 228
(1985). See also Gary W. Carter, The Commissioner’s Nonacquiescence: A Case for a National Court of Tax Appeals, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 879 (1986).
341. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982
(2005) (holding that Chevron-entitled regulations can reverse prior contrary decisions of
the lower federal courts).
342. Griswold, supra note 334.
343. The idea was advanced at least as early as 1925. Oscar E. Bland, Federal Tax
Appeals, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 1013 (1925). Among other advocates, see Henry J. Friendly,
Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 634, 644 (1974); Charles L.
B. Lowndes, Taxation and the Supreme Court, 1937 Term: Part II, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 165,
200 (1938); Stanley S. Surrey, Some Suggested Topics in the Field of Tax Administration,
25 WASH. U. L.Q. 399, 414-23 (1940); Roger John Traynor, Administrative and Judicial
Procedure for Federal Income, Estate and Gift Taxes—A Criticism and a Proposal, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1393 (1938).
344. See, e.g., Montgomery B. Angell, Procedural Reform in the Judicial Review of Controversies Under the Internal Revenue Statutes: An Answer to a Proposal, 34 ILL. L. REV.
151 (1939); E. Barrett Prettyman, A Comment on the Traynor Plan for Revision of Federal
Tax Procedure, 27 GEO. L.J. 1038, 1048-50 (1939); William A. Sutherland, New Roads to
the Settlement of Tax Controversies: A Critical Comment, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 359,
360-61 (1940).
345. For a recent call for creation of the court, see Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Creation of
National Appellate Tax Court Will Improve Tax Law, in TOWARD TAX REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRESIDENT OBAMA’S TASK FORCE 30, 30-32 (Tax Analysts ed., 2009).
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It is sometimes hoped that a tax-specialized appellate court would
make decisions of higher quality. 346 However, decisional harmony and
doctrinal clarity—there would be fewer inconsistent tax precedents—
always has been the more heavily emphasized justification.347
Opponents of the idea discount the extent to which the tax law
will be made more predictable.348 They also assert that tax specialization would create its own problems, such as that the court would forfeit a valuable perspective by losing contact with the general law and
would tilt in favor of the IRS. 349 The last of these objections—pro-IRS
orientation—is a species of the well-known administrative law theory
of “agency capture,” the idea that when an agency (in this case the
court) deals repeatedly with a party (usually the regulated industry;
here the IRS), it comes to sympathize and identify with that party’s
needs and concerns. 350 These objections have thus far made the proposal politically nonviable. 351
If a tax appellate court could be “captured” by the IRS, one would
expect that the Tax Court already has been so captured. There is
long-running disagreement about whether this has occurred. Some
practitioners and commentators believe that the Tax Court favors the
IRS, 352 and they point to studies suggesting that the IRS wins more
often in Tax Court than in district court.353
I am convinced that this view is incorrect. The studies that may
seem to hint at bias typically do not adequately control for differences
between the types of cases and the types of taxpayers appearing in

346. It is not obvious that a far higher caliber of decisions would ensue. “Tax law is
undeniably complex, but [several justices without much pre-judicial tax experience] have
demonstrated that it is not beyond the capacity of generalist judges and Justices to write
thoughtful and sophisticated opinions in tax cases.” Lawrence Zelenak, The Court and the
Code: A Response to The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation, 58 DUKE L.J. 1783,
1787 (2009).
347. See, e.g., ROSWELL MAGILL, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAXES 209 (1943).
348. Madaline Kinter Remmlein, Tax Controversies—Where Goes the Time?, 13 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 416 (1945).
349. See Robert N. Miller, Can Tax Appeals Be Centralized?, 23 TAXES 303 (1945).
350. See generally MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION 87-90, 270 (1955); James M. Landis, S. SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, 86TH CONG., REP. ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 71
(Comm. Print 1960). But see Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 342 (1974) (arguing that “agency capture” lacks theoretical foundation and is unsupported by evidence).
351. See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 345.
352. See Glenn Kroll, Are Tax Court Judges Partial to the Government?, 45 OIL & GAS
TAX Q. 135, 136 (1996).
353. See, e.g., Deborah A. Geier, The Tax Court, Article III, and the Proposal Advanced
by the Federal Courts Study Committee: A Study in Applied Constitutional Theory, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 985, 998 (1991).
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Tax Court versus district court.354 The better studies refute rather
than confirm the Tax Court’s alleged pro-IRS bias. 355
Nonetheless, perceptions sometimes matter as much as (or even
more than) reality. “Legislation concerning judicial organization
throughout our history has been a very empiric response to very definite needs.” 356 Those needs include widespread and stubborn misconceptions as well as accurate perceptions.
By the criteria adduced in this Article, we should continue to reject a national court of tax appeals. Such a court might contribute to
efficiency and uniformity, although the extent of such contribution is
difficult to estimate. But those are Second-Order Values, which yield
to the Primary Value in most cases. The Primary Value includes
remedies that are perceived to be fair, not just are in fact fair. Suspicion of the fairness of specialized tax tribunals is too widespread to be
ignored. Confidence in the system is too important to risk. 357
C. Court of Federal Claims Jurisdiction
As maintained above, the civil tax jurisdiction of the Tax Court
should be expanded substantially. The tax jurisdiction of the Court of
Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit should be abolished, however. Below, I first sketch the relevant history of these courts and then
explain why abolition of their tax jurisdiction would promote the values identified in Part II.C above.
1. History
As noted in Part II.B.1, the United States Court of Claims—the
original ancestor of the current Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit—was created in 1855. Its jurisdiction was significantly
expanded by the Tucker Act in 1887, granting the court nationwide

354. See, e.g., Robert M. Howard, Comparing the Decision Making of Specialized Courts
and General Courts: An Exploration of Tax Decisions, 26 JUS. SYS. J. 135, 138 n.1 (2005).
For example, there are more pro se taxpayers in Tax Court and more wealthy taxpayers in
district court.
355. See, e.g., James Edward Maule, Instant Replay, Weak Teams, and Disputed Calls:
An Empirical Study of Alleged Tax Court Judge Bias, 66 TENN. L. REV. 351, 353 (1999).
356. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT
13 (photo. reprint 1993) (1927).
357. Tax-specialized courts—whether trial or appellate—are parts of a larger topic.
There is a substantial and growing literature on specialized courts. See, e.g., Lawrence
Baum, Probing the Effects of Judicial Specialization, 58 DUKE L.J. 1667 (2009); Steve R.
Johnson, The Phoenix and the Perils of the Second Best: Why Heightened Appellate Deference to Tax Court Decisions Is Undesirable, 77 OR. L. REV. 235, 235 & n.1, 236 & n.2 (1998)
(citing sources). Thorough evaluation of proposals to create a national court of tax appeals
should address this literature.
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jurisdiction over most suits for monetary claims against the government, including claims for overpaid taxes.358
The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and its successors was further expanded by subsequent enactments, so that the Court of Federal Claims now hears a wide array of matters, including claims for
just compensation when the federal government takes private property, military and civilian compensation controversies, contract disputes, claims against the government for patent and copyright infringement, suits by Indian tribes, compensation claims for injuries
attributed to specified vaccines, suits by disappointed bidders in federal procurements, and congressional references of legislative proposals for compensation of individual claims.359
Beginning in 1925, the Court of Claims’ trial jurisdiction was
vested in a separate trial function consisting of commissioners, review of which was available from the court’s appellate judges (with
the later possibility of certiorari review by the Supreme Court). In
1973, the commissioners were renamed the trial judges. 360
The courts took their modern form in 1982 when the Court of
Claims was split. The old court’s trial jurisdiction was vested in a
new Article I court: the United States Claims Court (later renamed
the Court of Federal Claims). The old court’s appellate jurisdiction
was combined with that of the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals to comprise an Article III court: the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 361
During 2006, the Court of Federal Claims had about 8700 cases on
its docket, of which about 3100 involved the court’s general jurisdiction and 5600 were vaccine cases.362 The court had 302 tax cases
pending as of October 2010 and 263 as of October 2011.363 Sixty-one
new tax cases were commenced in the court in 2010 and fifty-four
in 2011. 364

358. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(c), 1491(a)(1) (2006).
359. United States Court of Federal Claims: The People’s Court, U.S. CT. FED. CLAIMS,
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/court_info/Court_History_Brochure.pdf
(last visited Feb. 2, 2014). “In recent years, the Court’s docket has been increasingly characterized by complex, high-dollar demand, and high profile cases in areas such areas as . . .
the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, the World War II internment of JapaneseAmericans, and the federal repository of civilian spent nuclear fuel.” Id. at 9-10.
360. Id. at 8.
361. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.
362. An Overview of the United States Court of Federal Claims, U.S. CT. FED. CLAIMS,
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/court_info/Court_History_Brochure.pdf
(last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
363. STATISTICS DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS: 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 291.
364. See id. at 35.
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In contrast, the number of tax cases commenced in district court
in 2011 was 1194, in 711 of which the government was the plaintiff
and in 481 of which the government was the defendant. 365 Both the
Court of Federal Claims and district court totals are dwarfed by Tax
Court cases: 29,720 Tax Court cases were started in 2011. 366
2. Reasons for Change
The original acquisition of tax jurisdiction by the Court of Claims
was a felicitous development. As shown in Parts II.B.1 and II.B.3
above, prepayment remedies did not yet exist and other refund remedies were underdeveloped. The subsequent development of Tax Court
and district court channels of redress, however, has rendered superfluous the Court of Federal Claims tax jurisdiction. It should be abolished.
Some taxpayers and their representatives would oppose this reform. First, it is human nature—and especially lawyers’ nature—to
want as many options as possible. When the Tax Court and the relevant district court have rejected a particular argument, those who wish
to press that argument take comfort in having a third available forum.
Second, the Court of Federal Claims possesses, or is believed to
possess, certain useful characteristics. It has gained a reputation in
some quarters as being a taxpayer-friendly tribunal. 367 Some consider
it the forum of choice when the taxpayer has a weak case on the
law—one likely to be rejected by the Tax Court. 368 And the court
styles itself as the “keeper of the nation’s conscience” and “the People’s Court,” 369 so taxpayers with good litigating equities may view
the court as an attractive forum. 370
Nonetheless, the Primary Value does not counsel in favor of retaining the tax jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. That value means that taxpayers should have remedies that both are fair and
effective and are perceived to be fair and effective. That requirement
365. Id. at 127. New district court tax cases were 1522 in 2007, 1451 in 2008, 1306 in
2009, and 1190 in 2010. Id. at 130.
366. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DATA BOOK 61 (2011).
367. See Christopher R. Egan, Checking the Beast: Why the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals is Good for the Federal System of Tax Litigation, 56 SMU L. REV. 721, 725 (2003).
368. For example, before being reversed, the Court of Federal Claims was the only
court to have held that the judicially crafted economic substance doctrine—the IRS’s principal weapon against recent tax shelters—is illegitimate as a violation of the separation of
powers doctrine. Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 755-56 (2004), vacated & remanded, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
369. United States Court of Federal Claims: The People’s Court, supra note 359, at 1.
370. For instance, the court, on the basis of sparing taxpayers unnecessary expense,
created a de minimis exception to the capitalization doctrine. Cincinnati, New Orleans &
Tex. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970). The Tax Court rejected Cincinnati Railway. Alacare Home Health Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1794
(2001).
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is not synonymous, however, with affording taxpayers redundant options simply to multiply their convenience and advantages.
Under the federal tax litigation structure proposed by this Article,
taxpayers would have prepayment opportunities in the Tax Court
and, when bankruptcy jurisdiction exists, in the bankruptcy court.
Taxpayers would have refund opportunities in the Tax Court, district
court, and, when bankruptcy jurisdiction exists, in the bankruptcy
court. The Primary Value does not require that taxpayers have yet
another refund opportunity, this time in the Court of Federal Claims.
The Primary Value not being engaged, the matter turns on Second-Order Values. Removing one redundant level of refund litigation
will decrease the potential for conflict among the courts, reducing
forum shopping and increasing predictability and efficiency.
One of the reasons for creation of the Court of Federal Claims was
development of a uniform body of law for cases within its jurisdiction.371 That rationale works well as to the numerous areas, sketched
above, in which the court has exclusive jurisdiction. Because of the
multiplicity of alternative tax refund fora, however, the uniformity
rationale would be better served in the tax area by abolishing the
Court of Federal Claims’ tax jurisdiction.372
If one tax forum is to be removed, which should it be? The Tax
Court should be retained because of its expertise and its opportunity
for prepayment review. The bankruptcy court should be retained because the tax issues of debtors are best handled as part of the total
complexion of the debtor’s situation. As between the district court
and the Court of Federal Claims, the district court should be retained. Jury trials are possible in district court but not in the Court
of Federal Claims. 373
More importantly, district courts are Article III courts while the
Court of Federal Claims is an Article I court. Thus, district court
judges have life tenure while Court of Federal Claims judges have
renewable fifteen-year terms (like Tax Court judges). 374 Those suspicious that courts may favor the IRS are more likely to see the district
court as the more vigilant sentinel.
Accordingly, the Primary Value reinforces the Second-Order Values. We should dispense with the tax jurisdiction of the Court of Fed371. An Overview of the United States Court of Federal Claims, supra note 362.
372. See, e.g., Martin D. Ginsburg, Commentary, The Federal Courts Study Committee
on Claims Court Tax Jurisdiction, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 631, 635-36 (1991).
373. Jury trials are not the norm in tax cases. But they are fairly common in cases
involving the trust fund recovery penalty under § 6672, and they occasionally are used in
refund cases involving other issues, e.g., Scriptomatic, Inc. v. United States, 74-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 9246, 33 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 827 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff’d, 555 F.2d 364 (3d Cir.
1977) (§ 385 case).
374. 28 U.S.C. § 172 (2006).
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eral Claims. That court would be left with the heavy workload and
the important duties entailed with the other types of cases, described
above, that comprise its jurisdiction.
IV. REFORMS AS TO AVAILABLE FORMS OF ACTION
The prior Part advanced proposals as to the courts that should be
available to hear federal tax disputes. This Part addresses the forms
of actions and the kinds of relief that should be available regardless
of the court.
I propose two such changes. First, the TEFRA partnership audit
and litigation rules enacted in 1982 have proved to be more harmful
than beneficial. In the main, they should be repealed. This would return us to partner-level audit and litigation, with some collateral
rules to promote efficiency.
Second, among the major products of the IRS Restructuring and
Reform Act of 1998 were the Collection Due Process (“CDP”) rules. In
the main, these rules have entailed great expenditure of effort and
resources by taxpayers, the IRS, and the courts without producing
commensurate genuine and lasting benefits for taxpayers. Some
commentators have urged abolition of the CDP regime. This Article
does not go that far. It proposes reducing the scope of, but not eliminating, judicial review of CDP decisions by the IRS Appeals Office.
A. TEFRA Rules
When originally enacted, the rules governing taxation of partnerships and their partners were intended to be, and largely were, simple, in order to facilitate the flexibility partnerships offer for non-tax
purposes. These rules are, in the main, embodied in Subchapter K of
Chapter 1 of the Code. Over time, Subchapter K has become anything
but simple, both because of unresolved tensions in its original design
and because—flexibility being the spawning ground of creative tax
planning 375—Congress has superimposed numerous complex étages
of anti-abuse on the originally simple edifice. 376 In my view, the game
is no longer worth the candle. Some others and I have advocated the

375. “A partnership is a magic circle. Anything that is dropped into it becomes exempt
from taxation. Forever. . . . Adherents to this view of subchapter K understand the word
‘flexible’ to mean that you can do absolutely anything you want without incurring tax.” Lee
A. Sheppard, Partnerships, Consolidated Returns and Cognitive Dissonance, 63 TAX NOTES
936, 936 (1994).
376. See, e.g., Lawrence Lokken, Taxation of Private Business Firms: Imagining a Future Without Subchapter K, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 249, 250 (1999) (“Subchapter K is a mess.”);
Andrea Monroe, What’s in a Name: Can the Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule Really Stop Partnership Tax Abuse?, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 401, 402 (2010) (“Partnership taxation is a
disaster.”).
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abolition of Subchapter K, leaving S corporations as the Code’s principal “pass-through” form. 377
This radical suggestion is unlikely to be adopted any time soon,
however. Thus, we should direct our attention to a lesser reform: the
abolition of the bulk of the TEFRA regime. Others 378 and I 379 have
advocated this reform previously, but additional persuasion will be
required to forge an effective consensus.
There are two reasons for ending the principal aspects of the
TEFRA rules. First, the TEFRA rules are unnecessary. The circumstances causing creation of the regime in 1982 no longer exist. Second, the TEFRA rules have proved to be harmful. From far promoting clarity, consistency, and efficiency in resolving partnership related controversies, the TEFRA rules have undermined these values.
1. Unnecessary
There is some question as to whether the TEFRA rules truly
were needed by the time of their enactment in 1982, 380 but let us
assume they were. That necessity has evaporated as a result of post1982 developments.
In 1986, Congress enacted § 469, the passive activity loss rules,
and strengthened the § 465 at-risk rules. Section 469 especially
struck at the core of tax shelter marketing. It prevented taxpayers
from using losses from passive activities (tax shelters) to offset their
income from other sources. 381 It was no longer necessary to examine
tax shelters individually and to disallow their alleged benefits on
technical or substantive grounds.
377. See Steve R. Johnson, The E.L. Wiegand Lecture: Administrability-Based Tax
Simplification, 4 NEV. L.J. 573, 589-96 (2004); Philip F. Postlewaite, I Come to Bury Subchapter K, Not to Praise It, 54 TAX LAW. 451 (2001).
378. See, e.g., Peter A. Prescott, Jumping the Shark: The Case for Repealing the
TEFRA Partnership Audit Rules, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 503 (2011); Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, TEFRA Partnership Rules: The Solution Becomes the Problem, 88 TAX NOTES
795 (2000); see also N. Jerold Cohen & William E. Sheumaker, When It’s Broke, Fix It! It’s
Time for TEFRA Reform, 136 TAX NOTES 815 (2012) (expressing concerns about the
TEFRA rules but stopping short of urging their repeal).
379. Johnson, supra note 377, at 596-602; Steve R. Johnson, Letter to the Editor,
TEFRA: No Fix Possible, Just Get Rid of It!, 136 TAX NOTES 964 (2012).
380. In the time before Congress acted in 1982, the IRS and the courts developed improved techniques for identifying, processing, and managing tax shelter cases. See Johnson, supra note 377, at 601. Of course, in the decades since 1982, technological capacities
have improved greatly, further undermining the bureaucratic necessity of the TEFRA
rules. See Prescott, supra note 378, at 562-64.
381. See generally Boris I. Bittker, Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Lawrence A. Zelenak, A
Whirlwind Tour of the Internal Revenue Code’s At-Risk and Passive Activity Loss Rules, 36
REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 673 (2002); Robert J. Peroni, A Policy Critique of the Section
469 Passive Loss Rules, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1988); Lawrence Zelenak, When Good Preferences Go Bad: A Critical Analysis of the Anti-Tax Shelter Provisions of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, 67 TEX. L. REV. 499 (1989).
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As a result and in short order, the old tax shelter market collapsed. After some years, shelter promoters found new strategies,
and new tax shelter vehicles were marketed in the 1990s and early
2000s. Critically, however, that second wave differed fundamentally
from the first wave, in ways that makes the TEFRA rules obsolete.
Before 1986, shelters were mass marketed to upper middle class as
well as rich taxpayers—thousands of shelters, most of which were
sold to scores or hundreds of “investors” each. Now, shelters are rifle
shots, not shotgun blasts. There are far fewer of them, and typically
each shelter partnership or LLC has only a few “investors,” mainly
large corporations or extremely high-wealth individuals, who are
likely to be audited in any event. The audit and litigation challenges
posed by current shelters are barely a shadow of challenges posed by
pre-1986 shelters.
Moreover, investors in current shelters typically can avoid the
TEFRA regime if they wish. In general, the regime does not apply to
“any partnership having 10 or fewer partners each of whom is an individual . . . , a C corporation, or an estate of a deceased partner.” 382
Since very few current tax shelter partnerships have over 10 investors, the TEFRA regime adds little to the IRS’s ability to combat
current shelters.
This observation leads to a broader point about the demography of
partnerships. At the “small” end of the spectrum, the TEFRA rules
have little applicability as a result of the “10 or fewer partners” exception.383 Depending on the year studied, partnerships have on average only five or six partners, 384 well within the exception. At the
“large” end of the spectrum, “electing large partnerships” with 100 or
more partners and “publicly traded partnerships” (which may have
thousands of partners) also are outside of TEFRA. 385 Thus, TEFRA is
potentially meaningful only in the middle of the partnership spectrum, but that middle is not densely populated. Less than ten percent

382. I.R.C. § 6231(a)(1)(B)(i). This exclusion, if applicable, is automatic unless the
partnership affirmatively elects into TEFRA treatment. Id. § 6231(a)(1)(B)(ii). Many current shelters do elect in. At least sometimes, this decision is motivated by the harms
caused by TEFRA described in the following subpart. In a number of important respects,
the TEFRA rules are unpredictable in their application, so electing into TEFRA treatment
gives the taxpayers additional opportunities to prevail if the IRS “messes up” or guesses
incorrectly how the reviewing court eventually will interpret TEFRA’s requirements.
383. This exception has been in the TEFRA rules from the start, and Congress has
shown little inclination to repeal or modify it. Id. § 6231(a)(1)(B).
384. See Prescott, supra note 378, at 558.
385. Electing large partnerships are outside of TEFRA under I.RC. § 6240(b)(1). With
narrow exceptions, publicly traded partnerships are treated as corporations for federal tax
purposes and so are outside of TEFRA. Id. § 7704.
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of partnerships are in this range, 386 and, as noted above, current tax
shelter partnerships typically are not there.
In the main, therefore, the TEFRA procedures are dispensable.
There are three particular rules that should be retained, though.
First, in general, partners are required on their returns to treat
items derived from partnerships consistently with the way those
items are treated on the partnership’s return. 387 Inconsistency allows
the IRS to automatically assess any resulting deficiency388 and may
expose the partner to a penalty. 389
Second, if the IRS settles some or all partnership items with some
partners, the other partners are generally entitled to settle their
items on similar terms.390 Both of these consistency rules—the consistent reporting rule and the consistent settlement rule—advance
the Second-Order Value of process efficiency and should be retained.
Third, § 6229 sets out limitation periods for IRS assessment of
partnership items. There was initial uncertainty as to the relationship between these periods and the general assessment limitation
periods prescribed by § 6501. It is now settled that the § 6229 rules
may extend the period allowable under § 6501 but may not contract
it. 391 This rule too should be retained to protect audits in case of late
filed partnership returns. 392
2. Harmful
The preceding subpart mentioned unresolved tensions in the original design of Subchapter K. A principal tension involves the “entity
versus aggregate” question: are partnerships entities separate from
their owners or are they mere aggregates of the activities of their
owners? 393 Creating unending confusion on specific substantive
issues, Subchapter K sometimes applies an entity approach, some386. In 2011, slightly over 3,285,000 partnerships filed returns with the IRS. Slightly
over 3,082,000 of them (93.8% of the total) had under ten partners. Rob DeCarlo, Lauren
Lee & Nina Shumofsky, Internal Revenue Service, Partnership Returns, 2011, STAT. OF
INCOME BULL., Fall 2013, at 81, 83 fig. C.
387. I.R.C. § 6222(a). Deviation is permitted, however, when the partner specifically
notifies the IRS. Id. § 6222(b).
388. Id. § 6222(c).
389. Id. § 6222(d).
390. Id. § 6222(c)(2).
391. See Andantech L.L.C. v. Commissioner, 331 F.3d 972 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
392. I have argued that repeal of the main TEFRA rules should not create problems for
the IRS auditing partnership items within I.R.C. § 6501’s statute of limitations. Nonetheless, should Congress harbor concern on this score, it could amend § 6229 to extend the
limitations period. Cf. I.R.C. § 6901(c)(1), (2) (extending the limitations period with respect
to transferee liability).
393. See, e.g., Bradley T. Borden, Aggregate-Plus Theory of Partnership Taxation, 43
GA. L. REV. 717, 719 (2009).
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times an aggregate approach, and sometimes a mixed entityaggregate approach. 394
TEFRA—a mix of the aggregate and entity approaches—extends
that confusion to the procedural realm. This tension is responsible for
many ambiguities and inefficiencies in the TEFRA rules. They
showed up early in numerous cases, many of which the IRS lost. Undoubtedly, the TEFRA rules sometimes resulted in the government
being able to assess and collect amounts it would otherwise have lost.
Equally undoubtedly, however, in other cases the IRS lost money because it construed the TEFRA rules in ways the courts later held to
be erroneous. Neither side of this revenue ratio ever has been (nor,
probably, can it ever be) reliably quantified, so we do not know the
extent to which TEFRA succeeded in its fiscal objectives, or even
whether it succeeded at all.
Even more troubling than the immense confusion the TEFRA
rules spawned early on is the fact that great confusion and dysfunction as to them persist even today. In an en banc opinion, the Tax
Court noted the “distressingly complex and confusing” nature of
TEFRA rules.395 Similarly, the Treasury has acknowledged that the
TEFRA rules sometimes “generate[] complex and burdensome procedural issues that do not contribute to the determination of the [partners’] tax liabilities.” 396
A trifurcation at the core of TEFRA is the source of many of these
problems. For TEFRA purposes, one needs to distinguish among
partnership items, non-partnership items, and affected items. Partnership items are items “more appropriately determined at the partnership level than at the partner level.” 397 Examples include each
partner’s share of the partnership’s income, gain, loss, deductions,
credits, non-deductible expenditures, and liabilities. 398 Penalties also
are partnership items to the extent that they relate to partnership
items.399 Affected items are not partnership items but are influenced
in their availability or extent by partnership items. 400 Examples
include items that vary in accordance with the partner’s income,
394. See ROBERT J. PERONI, STEVEN A. BANK & GLENN E. COVEN,
NESS ENTERPRISES: CASES AND MATERIALS 1002-04 (3d ed. 2006).

TAXATION OF BUSI-

395. Rhone-Poulenc Surfactants & Specialties, L.P. v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 533, 540
(2000); see also Shamik Trivedi & Jeremiah Coder, TEFRA Raises Complex Jurisdictional
Issues, Judge Says, 135 TAX NOTES 985 (2012) (reporting remarks of Tax Court Judge
Mark V. Holmes).
396. Tax Avoidance Transactions, 74 Fed. Reg. 7205, 7206 (proposed Feb. 13, 2009) (to
be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301) (proposing new regulations under § 6231).
397. I.R.C. § 6231(a)(3).
398. Treas. Reg. § 301.6231(a)(3)-1(a)(1).
399. I.R.C. § 6221.
400. Id. § 6231(a)(5).
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a partner’s basis in her partnership interest, and a partner’s atrisk limitation. 401
Even when the rules are clear, the potential for inefficiency is considerable. Partnership items are determined in TEFRA proceedings.402 Nonpartnership items are determined in separate, traditional
partner-level deficiency proceedings. Affected items are determined
after the partnership adjustments have been resolved, sometimes
through automatic computational adjustments and other times
through deficiency procedures.403 Thus, when a partner’s individual
return for a given year includes both partnership and nonpartnership items, multiple separate proceedings can be required
before the partner’s correct tax liability for the year is established
with finality.
Similarly, assume the partnership engages in a transaction that
the IRS finds abusive. Assume further that both the partnership and
a particular partner obtained legal opinions supporting the transaction’s tax legitimacy. When the reasonable reliance defense is raised
against the penalties asserted by the IRS, 404 it will have to be litigated in two separate cases. Reasonable reliance based on the opinion
obtained by the partnership is a partnership item that must be determined in a TEFRA proceeding. Reasonable reliance based on the
opinion obtained by the partner is an affected item that must be determined outside the TEFRA case.405 Every first-year law student is
told that our legal system abhors claim splitting. TEFRA requires it.
All of this inefficiency is compounded by the fact that the demarcations TEFRA requires are often difficult to make. In many situations, there can be reasonable disagreement as to whether an item is
a partnership, non-partnership, or affected item. If a party makes the
wrong choice and commences a proceeding on the wrong track, the
court will lack jurisdiction. Numerous recent cases have tested such
TEFRA jurisdictional issues, often with surprising results. 406
Under the trifurcation central to TEFRA, “[t]he potential for overlapping effects and hidden boomerangs is mind-numbing.” 407 And, of
401. Treas. Reg. § 301.6231(a)(5)-1.
402. I.R.C. § 6221.
403. See, e.g., N.C.F. Energy Partners v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 741, 744 (1987); Treas.
Reg. § 301.6231(a)(6)-1(a)(1).
404. See I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1).
405. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6221-1(d).
406. See Petaluma FX Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, 591 F.3d 649, 650-51, 656 (D.C.
Cir. 2010); Tigers Eye Trading, LLC v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 67 (2012); see also Karen C.
Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Reflections on Penalty Jurisdiction in Tigers Eye, 136
TAX NOTES 1581 (2012).
407. F. Brook Voght, Frederick H. Robinson & Michael E. Baillif, New Rules for
TEFRA Partnerships Provide More Flexibility in Resolving Disputes with the IRS, 88 J.
TAX’N 279, 279-80 (1998).

264

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:205

course, this is not the only source of the uncertainties and inefficiencies TEFRA has engendered.408
In short, the harms of the TEFRA partnership audit and litigation
rules now exceed the regime’s benefits. In 1982, TEFRA-like procedures also were enacted for S corporations. 409 They were repealed in
1996, however.410 We should learn that lesson in the partnership context as well.
B. Judicial Review of CDP Determinations
The Collection Due Process rules were enacted as part of the RRA
blizzard of reforms, discussed in Part II.B.10 above. They were not
the most ballyhooed aspect of the RRA at the time, but they have
proved to be the most consequential and controversial. 411
Before enactment of the CDP rules, once tax had been properly
assessed and notice and demand for payment had been made, the
IRS was permitted to file notice of the tax lien and to levy on the taxpayer’s property with minimal statutory hurdles to jump. The CDP
rules create speed bumps. Now, within five days after the IRS files
notice of the lien 412 or not less than thirty days before levy is effected, 413 the IRS is required to notify the taxpayer of its action or intended action. Among other things, the notice explains the nature of
the IRS action and the taxpayer’s rights, including the right to administrative hearing. The taxpayer has thirty days from the issuance
of the notice to request review by the IRS Appeals Office.414 The request operates to stay IRS collection action and also to stay the running of the statute of limitations on collection.415
Appeals Office CDP hearings are conducted informally. 416 What
matters may be considered at the Appeals Office hearing? First, the
Appeals Officer is required to verify that the IRS Collection Division
has complied with applicable statutory and regulatory provisions.417
408. See, e.g., Raby & Raby, supra note 378, at 795 (noting the persistence of TEFRA
statute of limitations uncertainties nearly two decades after TEFRA’s enactment).
409. Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, § 4(a), 96 Stat. 1669, 169192 (formerly codified at I.R.C. §§ 6221-6245).
410. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1307(c)(1), 110
Stat. 1755, 1781.
411. Tens of thousands of CDP hearing requests are made each year. Danshera Cords,
Collection Due Process: The Scope and Nature of Judicial Review, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021,
1022 n.7 (2005).
412. I.R.C. § 6320(a)(2)(C).
413. Id. § 6330(a)(2)(C).
414. Id. § 6330(a)(3)(B).
415. Id. § 6330(e). Normally, IRS efforts to collect unpaid taxes become time-barred ten
years after assessment. Id. § 6502(a).
416. See Treas. Reg. § 601.106(c).
417. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(1).
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Second, the taxpayer may raise “any relevant issue relating to the
unpaid tax or the proposed levy, including—(i) appropriate spousal
defenses; (ii) challenges to the appropriateness of collection actions;
and (iii) offers of collection alternatives . . . .” 418 Third, the taxpayer
may contest the underlying tax liability if she “did not receive any
statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability.”419
The CDP rules expressly recognize the tension between revenue
collection and taxpayer protection. Congress directed Appeals Officers to determine in their resolution of the matter “whether any proposed collection action balances the need for the efficient collection of
taxes with the legitimate concern of the person that any collection
action be no more intrusive than necessary.” 420
If the taxpayer is dissatisfied with the Appeals Office’s determination, she may appeal within thirty days to the Tax Court.421 The
standard of review is de novo when the underlying tax liability is
properly at issue and abuse of discretion when it is not.422
Despite its beguiling name (who could possibly be against due process in collection?), CDP was controversial from the start. A lively
debate has gone on for years, with knowledgeable, passionate, and
eloquent champions on both sides.423 Defenders see the judicial review component of CDP as “a step in the progression of the rule of
law principles that came to permeate twentieth century legal culture.” 424 Detractors find it “an outstanding regulatory failure” that
“likely hurts those who most need its promised protection from arbitrary agency action,” and argue that CDP demonstrates how “adversarial process, used in the wrong place and the wrong time, becomes
a rule of deception rather than a rule of law.” 425
There is little question that CDP has been extremely expensive in
terms of the Second-Order Value of efficiency. The many tens of
thousands of CDP cases claim substantial resources from the IRS
418. Id. § 6330(c)(2)(A).
419. Id. § 6330(c)(2)(B).
420. Id. § 6330(c)(3)(C).
421. Id. § 6330(d)(1).
422. H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 266 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
423. See, e.g., [2004] 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE ANN. REP. 226-45, 451-70, 498-510
(discussing critiques of CDP and proposals for its reform). The debate between Professor
Leslie Book and Bryan Camp identified key issues. Bryan Camp & Leslie Book, Point &
Counterpoint: Should Collection Due Process Be Repealed?, 24 A.B.A. SEC. TAX’N NEWS Q.
11 (2004).
424. Leslie Book, The Collection Due Process Rights: A Misstep or a Step in the Right
Direction?, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1145, 1161 (2004).
425. Bryan T. Camp, The Failure of Adversarial Process in the Administrative State, 84
IND. L.J. 57, 57-58 (2009).
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and the Tax Court. They also delay collection and, by extending the
collection limitations period, postpone the day of repose. 426
These costs have not been justified by appreciable gains to the
Primary Value of taxpayer protection. First, the IRS wins the overwhelming majority of CDP cases. 427 Second, most of the relatively few
taxpayer “wins” are victories in name only. They result in recommital
of the case to the administrative process, with the taxpayer’s ultimate position often benefitted little at the end of the day. Third, the
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard of proof may cause losing
taxpayers to feel they did not receive a fair day in court.
Another problem is that CDP litigation mixes and confuses the
executive and judicial roles. The Executive Branch (in this case, the
IRS) applies the law. The courts exist to make sure the IRS follows
the law, not to interfere with the IRS’s exercise of administrative discretion or second-guess the choices the IRS made among options legally available to it. 428 The notoriously loose standards for judicial
review of Appeals Office CDP determinations 429 can tempt the reviewing court to overstep its legitimate role. The Tax Court sometimes displays a regrettable tendency to operate as a self-appointed
superintendent of tax administration.430 That is properly the role of
Congress, the Treasury, and the IRS Oversight Board, not of a court
of law, 431 except when Congress expressly provides to the contrary. 432
426. One sorry aspect of this has been the use (or abuse) of CDP by tax defiers (the now
in-vogue name for those once called “tax protestors”) to delay the system through assertion
of worthless arguments. See Steve Johnson, The 1998 Act and the Resources Link Between
Tax Compliance and Tax Simplification, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1013, 1061 (2003) (proposing
changes to reduce this problem).
427. See Camp, supra note 425, at 57 (noting, as of 2009, that “[o]f the over sixteen
million collection decisions made since 2000, courts have reviewed at most 3,000 and have
reversed only sixteen”).
428. For an example of a court overstepping its role—and later having to retract its
excesses—see Fidelity Equip. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Ga.
1978), vacated in part, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 9319 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (§ 7429 case).
429. See, e.g., Cords, supra note 411, at 1024 (arguing that judicial review of CDP determinations “is an unsettled and problematic area of law because it lacks clear direction
from Congress”).
430. See, e.g., Rauenhorst v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 157, 169-73 (2002) (holding the
IRS to a position expressed in previous Revenue Rulings despite the fact that Revenue
Rulings do not have the force of law); Walker v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 537, 550-51 (1993)
(same).
431. The Tax Court has struggled for generations to be recognized as a court, not an
agency. See, e.g., DUBROFF, supra note 28, at 165-215.
432. For example, the IRS is authorized to relieve spouses of the normal joint and several liability as to joint income tax returns when “taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the individual liable.” I.R.C. § 6015(f)(1). Persons denied such relief by the IRS may bring an action in Tax Court. In such action, the Tax Court
may “determine the appropriate relief.” Id. § 6015(e)(1)(A). Two courts have held that this
provision empowers the Tax Court to go outside the administrative record and proceed de
novo in determining the demands of equity. Wilson v. Commissioner, 705 F.3d 980, 987
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Despite these problems, I do not join those who call for complete
repeal of the CDP rules. These rules have been salutary in at least
one respect. In recent years, “the IRS has implemented procedures
and controls significantly improving [its] compliance with legal and
internal guidelines” applicable to its seizure of property to satisfy tax
debts. 433 This is the wholesome product of spotlights on IRS derelictions cast by Congressional oversight, reports by the National Taxpayer Advocate, 434 investigations by the Treasury Inspector General
for Tax Administration, 435 and—yes—by the CDP process. CDP hearings and litigation act as a tripwire alerting the IRS to, and prodding
it to correct, its breaches of tax collection rules.
Based on the foregoing, I propose two changes to CDP. First, the
current rule—§ 6330(c)(2)(A)(iii)—that authorizes consideration of
collection alternatives offered by the taxpayer should be amended.
Taxpayers should still be able to present such alternatives to the Appeals Office. However, the Appeals Office’s decision with respect to
such alternatives should no longer be judiciary reviewable.
Second, the current rules—§ 6330(c)(1) and § 6330(c)(2)(A)(ii)—
that require verification of and permit challenges to collection procedures should be amended. Only failures to follow procedures required
by a statute or regulation should be judicially reviewable. Failures to
follow lesser requirements—such as those set out in the Internal
Revenue Manual—should be fodder for administrative review (to
serve the tripwire function) but not for judicial review. 436
V. REFORM AS TO PREREQUISITE TO SUIT
A. Flora “Full Payment” Rule
We need not explore whether the majority or the dissenters in
Flora II had the better of the statutory construction argument. Our
inquiry is whether the full payment rule is wise as a matter of policy.

(9th Cir. 2013); Commissioner v. Neal, 557 F.3d 1262, 1263-64 (11th Cir. 2009). The Neal
court expressly distinguished the language of § 6015(e) from that of § 6330(d)(1). Neal, 557
F.3d at 1276. But see id. at 1287 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (“Today, the court has given the
Tax Court the authority to second-guess the Commissioner at its whim . . . .”).
433. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., FISCAL YEAR 2011 REVIEW OF COMPLIANCE WITH LEGAL GUIDELINES WHEN CONDUCTING SEIZURES OF TAXPAYERS’ PROPERTY
3 (2011).
434. See I.R.C. § 7803(c)(2)(B).
435. See id. § 7803(d)(1)(A), (B).
436. Cf. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 756-57 (1979) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not prevent use of evidence obtained in violation of procedures set out in
the Internal Revenue Manual); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995) (holding that an agency regulation—a state prison regulation—did not create a protected liberty
interest entitling the affected prisoner to procedural due process protections).
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I join those who believe that it is not. 437 I.R.C. § 7422 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a) should be amended to permit refund suits to be brought
even upon partial payment of the assessed liabilities.
The full payment rule traduces the Primary Value: it blunts the
efficacy of taxpayer remedies. A full payment requirement shuts the
courthouse door to some taxpayers who have reasonable claims that
they overpaid their taxes. The Flora II dissenters explained this consequence of a full payment rule:
Where a taxpayer has paid, upon a normal or a “jeopardy” assessment, either voluntarily or under compulsion of distraint, a part
only of an illegal assessment and is unable to pay the balance
within the two-year period of limitations, he would be deprived of
any means of establishing the invalidity of the assessment and of
recovering the amount illegally collected from him, unless it be
held . . . that full payment is not a condition upon the jurisdiction
of District Courts to entertain suits for refund. Likewise, taxpayers
who pay assessments in installments would be without remedy to
recover early installments that were wrongfully collected should
the period of limitations run before the last installment is paid. 438

It is impossible to quantify the extent of this problem, but one fact
is certain and two facts are probable. It is certain that some taxpayers experience the problem. It is probable that some of those taxpayers experience significant economic distress when the problem hits
them. And it is probable that enough taxpayers experience enough
hardship that this concern is worth addressing. The four Flora II dissenters certainly thought so. They referred to “great hardships,”
“harsh injustice,” and a “grossly unfair and . . . shockingly inequitable result.” 439 Commentators have echoed the concern. 440
The Flora I majority conceded that “the requirement of full payment may in some instances work a hardship.” 441 The Flora II major437. See, e.g., Thomas Vance McMahan, Note, Income Tax—Federal Tax Court—
Election of Remedies—Federal District Court Lacks Jurisdiction of Suit for Refund of Income Tax Payments Which Do Not Discharge Taxpayer’s Entire Assessment. Flora v. United
States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960), 39 TEX. L. REV. 353, 355 (1961) (“Viewed from a policy standpoint[,] . . . [the Flora II Court] chose the less desirable of the two [options].”).
438. Flora II, 362 U.S. 145, 195-96 (1960) (Whittaker, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). A refund claim must be made within the later of three years after the return was filed
or two years after the tax was paid. I.R.C. § 6511(a). If the three-year period applies, the
amount that can be refunded is generally limited to the amount paid within three years
before the claim is made. Id. § 6511(b)(2)(A). If the two-year period applies, the amount
that can be refunded is limited to the amount paid within two years before the claim is
made. Id. § 6511(b)(2)(B); see also id. § 6532(a)(1).
439. Flora II, 362 U.S. at 195 & n.22, 198 (Whittaker, J., dissenting).
440. See, e.g., McMahan, supra note 437, at 355; J.Q. Riordan, Must You Pay Full Tax
Assessment Before Suing in the District Court?, 8 J. TAX’N 179, 181 (1958); Carlton Smith,
Let the Poor Sue for Refund Without Full Payment (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law,
Working Paper No. 256, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1354145.
441. Flora I, 357 U.S. 63, 75 (1958).
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ity sought to alleviate the concern by maintaining that the taxpayer
so harmed should have challenged the IRS adjustments before assessment in the Tax Court. “If he permits his time for filing such an
appeal [to the Tax Court] to expire, he can hardly complain that he
has been unjustly treated, for he is in precisely the same position as
any other person who is barred by a statute of limitations.” 442
This is not a full answer to the problem. First, as proposed in Part
III.A above, this Article would expand the Tax Court’s jurisdiction.
Under current law, however, the Tax Court does not have deficiency
jurisdiction over all types of federal taxes. 443
Second, the taxpayer may not have realized until after expiration
of the Tax Court petition period 444 that the adjustments proposed by
the IRS are legally questionable. For example, the IRS’s adjustment
may have appeared correct initially but was cast into doubt by a decision handed down after the Tax Court petition period lapsed. Or, the
adjustment may have been dubious from the start, but the taxpayer
received bad advice from her lawyer or accountant, the error of which
was discovered only after the petition period ended.
Third, the taxpayer may have been unaware that a notice of deficiency had been issued, and thus unaware that the clock had started
to run on a Tax Court petition. This is especially possible for poor
taxpayers—the very ones least likely to be able to satisfy a full payment prerequisite. One highly regarded director of a low-income taxpayer clinic reported:
In my experience, some common reasons why the poor fail to receive the notice [of deficiency] are: First, the poor tend to move frequently, failing to notify either the IRS or the Post Office of address changes—particularly in cases of eviction. Second, they often
live in group housing situations where their names are not on the
mailbox, so either the Postal Service employees do not deliver the
certified notices or another household member picks up the notice
but fails to give it to the taxpayer. Third, their mail is often stolen
from mailboxes that have their locks perpetually broken. 445

In such situations, the Flora II majority’s “you should have filed a
Tax Court petition” rebuke is too harsh. 446
442. Flora II, 362 U.S. at 175.
443. See I.R.C. § 6211(a) (limiting the Tax Court’s deficiency jurisdiction to income,
estate, and gift taxes).
444. In general, the Tax Court petition must be filed within ninety days after the IRS
issues it. Id. § 6213(a).
445. Smith, supra note 440, at 3 n.7.
446. Congress has already made this value judgment (although only after Flora II was
decided). See I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B) (allowing taxpayers to challenge at a CDP hearing “the
existence or amount of the underlying tax liability . . . if [she] did not receive any statutory
notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dis-
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Sometimes, taxpayers may have an administrative remedy. For
instance, they might be able to challenge the liability via an offer-incompromise based on doubt as to liability under § 7121 or via a CDP
hearing under § 6320 and § 6330. However, such remedies will not
always be available, often for reasons similar to the reasons why Tax
Court review may be an empty remedy.
Thus, there is a Primary Value objection against the full payment
rule. Are there Second-Order Values of sufficient moment to overcome that objection? I think not.
The Flora II majority expressed three policy concerns about a partial payment rule: (1) it could encourage claims splitting, with taxpayers paying part of the liability and bringing a refund action but
challenging most of the asserted liability in a Tax Court case; (2) it
could shift cases away from the Tax Court and into district court;
and (3) it could threaten revenue collection. 447 None of these concerns
are substantial.
There are psychological and financial barriers to claims splitting.
It is nerve-wracking enough for a taxpayer to litigate against the IRS
in one case; few would have the appetite to “double their fun.” And, of
course, two cases are more expensive to prosecute than one. Were
claims to be split, the courts have tools by which to protect themselves. For example, one court can stay its case pending resolution in
the other court, then apply a doctrine of preclusion or a “show cause
order” to expedite resolution of its case. Finally, if I have underestimated the gravity of the concern, Congress could amend the jurisdictional statutes of the Tax Court or the district courts to prohibit them
from hearing matters when substantially related matters already are
at issue in other courts.
The channeling concern is diminished by this Article. When Flora
II was decided, and still today, the Tax Court was and is without
general refund jurisdiction. Part III.A above proposes giving the Tax
Court such jurisdiction. Were both proposals adopted, a taxpayer in a
partial payment world could obtain a desired refund remedy without
abandoning the Tax Court for district court. There sometimes would
be reasons—perhaps desire for a jury or better precedents—for preferring district court over Tax Court, but one may doubt that this
would occur with unacceptable frequency.
In any event, Flora II’s channeling goal is a bit dated. The Court
endorsed the Tax Court as the preferred tax trial tribunal in Dobson,
and Dobson influenced Flora II.448 Congress partially reversed Dobpute such tax liability.”).
447. Flora II, 362 U.S. at 165-66, 176.
448. See Flora v. United States, 246 F.2d 929, 931 (10th Cir. 1957) (quoting Dobson v.
Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 501-02 (1943)).
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son by directing that appellate courts give district court decisions no
less deference than they give Tax Court decisions.449
The threat to revenue concern is the weakest of all. A refund suit
comes after assessment. Following assessment and notice and demand for payment, the IRS is authorized to employ its full panoply of
collection tools, described in Part II.B.6 above. The filing of a refund
suit after partial payment would impose no bar to the IRS proceeding
with enforced collection of the unpaid portion of the assessment. The
IRS might choose to stay such collection in the exercise of its administrative discretion, but one must presume that the IRS would use
this discretion in a fashion consistent with its statutory duties.
Thus, any adverse Second-Order Values effects of a partial payment rule would be manageable. They do not outweigh the Primary
Value benefits of such a rule. Congress should amend the relevant
statutes to overturn Flora II.
B. Changes Not Proposed
Among the core problems of litigation generally are its cost and,
derivatively, the prospect of unequal access to justice. These problems do exist as to federal tax litigation. I make no proposals along
these lines, however, for two reasons. First, these challenges are far
from unique to federal tax litigation. They pervade many kinds of
litigation in the United States and elsewhere. Second, and more significantly, strides have been made in addressing the problems. The
IRS Appeals Office has been effective in resolving tax controversies
informally, inexpensively, and without the need for litigation. The
Tax Court’s small case procedures allow taxpayers, often appearing
pro se, to resolve cases faster and less expensively. 450 The growth of
low-income taxpayer clinics 451 and the existence of the Office of the
Taxpayer Advocate 452 have been boons to many.
A recent phenomenon has been the institution of suits against
Treasury or the IRS based, not on traditional remedies set out in the
Internal Revenue Code or related statutes, 453 but upon the general
judicial review provisions of the APA. 454 The applicability of the AIA
has been and is being tested in such “pure” APA tax suits.

449. I.R.C. § 7482(a).
450. See id. §§ 7436(c), 7463; TAX CT. R. 170-174.
451. Among the useful provisions of the RRA was federal financial support for such
clinics. See I.R.C. § 7526.
452. See id. §§ 7803(c), 7811.
453. Such as the provisions governing deficiency, refund, and CDP actions. See supra
Parts II.B.1, II.B.3, IV.B.
454. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012).
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In the Cohen line of cases, 455 for example, taxpayers used the APA
to obtain judicial invalidation of an IRS procedure for returning
overpayments of telephone excise taxes. The APA was held not to
foreclose such suit. 456 Similarly, in Oklahoma v. Sebelius, a case currently pending in district court, Oklahoma is using the APA to
challenge regulations under § 36B as to tax credits with respect
to medical insurance coverage purchased through federally established exchanges. The government has moved to dismiss, in part on
AIA grounds.457
Such “pure” APA tax suits raise potentially troubling questions
about their effect on orderly tax administration and their consistency
with the purposes behind the AIA. 458 Nonetheless, this Article refrains from offering a specific proposal in this context. There need to
be more decided cases before the reality and magnitude of the potential problems can be accurately ascertained and the contours of condign correction can be responsibly proposed.
VI. CONCLUSION
Unlike Athena, the current federal tax litigation system did not
spring full-blown from the brow of Zeus. As we have seen, it developed piecemeal over nearly two centuries, with the pace of change
being greatly accelerated by the enactment of the modern federal
income tax.
The federal tax litigation system has been especially shaped by
the Defining Dozen events and trends described above. From them,
we can infer the values that drive the system. The most powerful of
those goals—the Primary Value—is providing remedies for taxpayers
and affected third parties that are fair and effective and are perceived to be fair and effective. In situations in which this imperative
does not operate or operates only weakly, a variety of Second-Order

455. To date, there are four decisions in this line: In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Fed.
Excise Tax Refund Litig. (Cohen I), 539 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2008), rev’d in part sub
nom. Cohen v. United States (Cohen II), 578 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009), aff’d in part, Cohen v.
United States (Cohen III), 650 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc), on remand In re LongDistance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise Tax Refund Litig. (Cohen IV), 853 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D.D.C.
2012) (holding on remand that refund mechanism established by the IRS violated the
APA’s notice-and-comment procedure requirements).
456. Cohen II, 578 F.3d at 7-11, aff’d in part, 650 F.3d at 724-27 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see
also Swisher v. United States, 2009-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 70,293 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
457. Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint at 16-18, Oklahoma v. Sebelius, No. 6:11-cv-00030-RAW (E.D. Okla. Dec. 3, 2012).
458. Not all pure APA tax suits implicate the AIA, at least as the AIA is currently understood. See, e.g., Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013) (invalidating Treasury
regulations as to tax return preparers); Anonymous v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 13 (2010)
(holding that the APA did not prevent the IRS from disclosing a private letter ruling adverse to the taxpayer).

2013]

REFORMING FEDERAL TAX LITIGATION

273

Values govern. These include protecting the revenue, enhancing decisional accuracy, and promoting process efficiency.
Based on these criteria, major portions of the current system are
sound. However, some features should be altered. In some instances,
they were unwise from the start, the result of momentary exuberances that ill serve the system over the longer haul. In other instances,
the features reasonably balanced the relevant values at the time of
their enactment or promulgation, but the constellation of pertinent
considerations has subsequently realigned.
Based on the relevant values, this Article has set out an agenda
for reform of federal tax litigation. The proposals include expanding
the tax jurisdiction of the Tax Court, abolishing the tax jurisdiction of
the Court of Federal Claims, continued rejection of a national court of
tax appeals, substantially repealing the TEFRA partnership audit
and litigation rules, limiting judicial review of CDP determinations,
and abolishing the Flora II “full payment” prerequisite to refund
suits. The agenda having been defined by this Article, it will be the
work of future articles to develop these proposals in greater detail.
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